Full citation – Référence complète:
Bilić-Dujmušić, S., Milivojević, F. “Kampanja Gaja Koskonija u Dalmaciji”. Živa Antika / Antiquité Vivante 74.1-2 (2024), pp. 191–216.

DOI: https://www.doi.org/10.47054/ZIVA24741-2191bd

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Summary. – The article focuses on the campaign of Gaius Cosconius in Dalmatia from 78 to 76 BC, a lesser known but significant episode in the history of Roman military interventions in the eastern Adriatic. The campaign took place at a turbulent time in Roman history, shortly after the civil war between Sulla and Marius and the abdication of Sulla as dictator. These events led to instability in Roman politics and a fragile “constitution”, exacerbated by problems throughout the Mediterranean. In Illyricum, the Delmatae and other regional actors threatened the Roman sphere of influence and Cosconius, invested with proconsular powers, was dispatched to restore order and regain Roman control.

The authors note that there are few primary sources about Cosconius’ campaign. Most of the information coming from late antique historians such as Orosius and Eutropius. These sources provide few details, with their accounts probably coming from earlier, now lost works, possibly by Livy. What can be pieced together from these fragments is that the campaign lasted two years, during which Cosconius captured Salona, a prominent centre, and “subdued much of Dalmatia”. However, these achievements are only described in broad strokes, leaving the specific events and strategies of the campaign open to interpretation.

Cosconius’ task was obviously not only to defeat the Delmatae, but also to restore Roman authority in the wider area. The campaign appears to have involved both direct military confrontations and wider efforts to secure strategic points to prevent future unrest. The capture of Salona is emphasised as the high point of the campaign, but the exact timing of this in the sequence of operations – whether at the beginning or the end – is disputed. Furthermore, the conclusion of the campaign was an internal challenge in the form of a mutiny led by Marcus Atilius Bulbus, Cosconius’ subordinate officer. This incident, to which Cicero refers, shows that Cosconius had considerable difficulty maintaining discipline among his troops. The mutiny appears to be linked to the general unrest in the Roman Republic at the time (Lepidus’ revolt), which may have been influenced by political factions in Rome. Despite these challenges, Cosconius managed to maintain control of his troops and achieve his goals.

An interesting element explored in the article is whether Cosconius’ campaign extended beyond Dalmatia and included operations against the Iapodes, a community further north. A fragment by the historian Sallust, which refers to an entry into Iapodia (primam modo Iapydiam ingressus), raises the possibility that Cosconius’ campaign was more extensive than traditionally assumed. If true, this would indicate a more comprehensive strategy to secure the northern territories of Illyricum and reflect Rome’s growing concern for stability throughout the Adriatic region.

Given the information available, the authors present three possible routes for Cosconius’ campaign, each reflecting a particular strategic focus. The first route involves an immediate landing near Salona and a direct confrontation with the Delmatae in order to recapture the city and subdue the surrounding territories. In this interpretation, Salona was at the centre of Roman operations from the outset. An alternative of the first route envisages a landing near Narona, with Cosconius advancing through Delmataean territory in a calculated flanking manoeuvre and finally capturing Salona from the rear. The second scenario envisages a more ambitious plan, starting with an advance north from Aquileia into Iapodia, aiming to neutralise the threats in the region’s hinterland before advancing south into Liburnia and finally Salona. A third possibility is that Cosconius began his campaign by disembarking in Liburnia, an area allied with the Romans to the north of Dalmatia. This alternative route would have allowed Cosconius to gain a safe foothold in a friendly region before advancing southwards. From Liburnia, his troops could have headed for strategically important points to neutralise threats in the hinterland and possibly combat unrest among the Iapodes in the north. This approach could have been aimed at securing Rome’s wider interests in the north of the Adriatic before focussing on the Delmatae. By crossing Promona and securing control of this important stronghold, Cosconius would have gained a significant logistical advantage for launching further operations. This route underlines the possibility that the campaign was not limited to a direct confrontation with the Delmatae, but involved a broader strategy to stabilise a larger part of Illyricum under Roman control. All in all, these proposed routes illustrate the logistical and tactical difficulties Cosconius was likely to have faced in overcoming both geographical and political challenges during the campaign.

The long-term consequences of Cosconius’ campaign were considerable. By subduing the Delmatae and capturing Salona, Cosconius secured a period of relative peace in the region that lasted for more than two decades. This stability allowed Rome to focus on other challenges, such as the Sertorian War in Spain and the threat of pirates in the Mediterranean. The campaign also strengthened Roman dominance over local communities by forcing the Delmatae to pay tribute and adhere to Roman-imposed borders. These measures probably also included territorial adjustments and the strengthening of Rome’s local allies, such as the Liburni, who benefited from the redistribution of strategic positions such as Promona.

Despite his achievements, Cosconius did not receive the honour of a triumph, a prestigious recognition often bestowed on successful generals. The authors argue that this omission reflects the rigid social hierarchies and political prejudices of the Roman elite. As Cosconius came from a plebeian family, he lacked the aristocratic pedigree that often influenced such decisions. His case emphasises how Roman politics could overshadow military merit, even in the face of significant achievements.

The article briefly discusses the possibility that Cosconius was on trial under the lex Servilia, a law against corruption among Roman magistrates. Valerius Maximus reports that Cosconius was accused of misbehaviour but escaped conviction by publicly discrediting his accuser. The authors speculate whether these accusations could be linked to his time in Illyricum. They hypothesise that the complexities of the campaign, including tensions with local communities and issues of troop discipline, may have led to such allegations. However, due to the limited evidence available, the exact nature and timing of the allegations remain uncertain, leaving this aspect of Cosconius’ career open to interpretation.

The article concludes that Cosconius’ campaign, although not well documented, represents a pivotal moment for the consolidation of Roman power in the eastern Adriatic. It set a precedent for later Roman interventions in the region, including those under Julius Caesar and Augustus. The authors emphasise the importance of reassessing this campaign in the context of Roman military and administrative practises, and highlight the need to piece together the fragmentary historical record in order to better understand Rome’s strategies in its peripheral territories. Although many details remain unclear, the impact of the campaign on local communities and its role in wider Roman expansion make it a remarkable episode in the history of the late Republic.