MARKO JERKOVIĆ

University of Zagreb
Faculty of Croatian Studies
mjerkovic@fhs.unizg.hr

QUARRELS AND HARMONY IN THE DOMINICAN ORDER. THE COMMENTARY OF HUMBERT OF ROMANS ON THE *RULE OF AUGUSTINE*

Abstract. – The 13th century *Expositio regulae sancti Augustini*, written by the Dominican friar Humbert of Romans, provides some useful insights into the utilization of Saint Augustine's thought within medieval monasticism. This paper deals with the chapter of the *Expositio* concerned with the dangers of quarrelling and Augustine's commands about harmony. Such analysis examines the textual strategies, spiritual conceptions and practical procedures that had to be appropriated by the Dominican brethren to preserve the Apostolic ideal of "one heart and one mind", mandated by Augustine. The paper is concerned with Humbert's main topics: the correlation among quarrelling, harmony and the religious state; sin and conscience; monastic authority; achieving justice; silence, virtues, prayer, and love. The preservation of the Apostolic ideal was not only a matter of spiritual edification; it also carried institutional implications. Namely, Humbert's text was written as a conservative response to the initiative to change the normative set-up of the Dominicans. It was a text that strongly advocated the utility of the Rule of Augustine for his Order.

The most extensive work of the prolific Dominican author Humbert of Romans (c. 1190-1277) is the *Expositio regulae sancti Augustini*.[1] In it, Humbert, who was the fifth General Master (the highest official) of the Dominican order from 1254 to 1266,[2] meticulously commented on Augustine's rule, enriching his Commentary with numerous quotations from the Bible, patristic and monastic authorities, hagiographic *exempla*, and medieval glosses.[3] Humbert's source stands as an excellent example of the utilization of an ancient rule in a medieval world, more precisely,

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[1] Hereinafter cited as: Expositio regulae.

[2] On Humbert: Tugwell 1982, 31-35; Brett 1984; Schnakenberg 2020, 78-158.

[3] Brett 1984, 117-118.

in the milieu of a 13th century reformed monasticism.[4] Yet, in comparison to other Dominican sources, this one has received less scholarly attention. In 2002, Cygler and Melville used it to juxtapose the value of Augustine's rule and Dominican constitutions in the Order's life.[5] In addition, Schnakenberg (2020), in his doctoral thesis, offered a comprehensive study of the Commentary, indicating that it should be seen as a template for the socialization of Dominican friars.[6]

In this paper, I will focus on a single chapter of the Commentary, namely the one reflecting upon Augustine's commands about not quarrelling.[7] My intention is to lay bare the conceptions and practices that had to be accepted by each individual to realize Augustine's ideal of a harmonious religious community. In the Commentary, Humbert offers a set of instructions that had to be deeply set inside each individual's conscience in order to root out the human inclination towards quarrelling and attain a more perfect human state in accordance with Augustine's views on monasticism. Hence, by scrutinizing Humbert's way of reading the Rule, we come closer to understanding the textual, spiritual, and procedural technologies that formulated 13th century Dominican interiorly, and, since these individuals were connected within the network of monastic practises, which consequently produced a kind of community that was disciplined in accordance with Augustine's understanding of the *vita perfectionis*.[8]

The ideal of harmony

The Rule of Augustine was known to medieval monasticism in different redactions.[9] The one appropriated by the Dominicans was the *Regula recepta*, which essentially evolved from the version called the *Praeceptum*.[10] In its opening lines, the *Praeceptum* defines the prime command: *Primum, propter quod in unum estis congregati, ut unanimes habitetis in domo et sit vobis anima una et cor unum in Deo.*[11] Hence, to live in a monastery means to live in harmony as one. Furthermore, attaining such oneness means to be Apostolic-like and emanate the first Christian

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[4] On the 13th century monasticism generally: Melville 2016, 193-297, on the Dominicans 232-248.

[5] Cygler-Melville 2002, 419-454.

[6] Schnakenberg 2020, 37, 331-356.

[7] Expositio regulae, 481-529.

[8] On the medieval conceptions of *vita perfectionis*: Eder, D., Manuwald, H. & Schmidt, C. (eds.) 2021.

[9] More in: Ponesse 2020, 393-428.

[10] The standard edition is Verheijen's: Regula Augustini, 417-437. The text of the Dominican redaction was textually preserved in Humbert's Expositio regulae and it differs only slightly from Verheijen's edition.

[11] Regula Augustini, 417; cited in accordance with: Expositio regulae, 66.

community of Jerusalem, which, as Acts 4:32 note, lived in exact conformity with "one in heart and soul".[12] Clearly, the purpose of a monastic life was presented as the obligation to not only live together physically, but to also strive towards transcending the earthly experience of community by spiritually merging with one's neighbour in God.

The necessity of such striving is confirmed by the line by which the *Praeceptum* was prefaced: *Ante omnia, fratres charissimi, diligatur Deus, deinde proximus, quia ista praecepta sunt principaliter nobis data*.[13] This line, referring to Christ's commands of love (cf. Mt 22:37-39), became in medieval manuscripts an integral part of the *Praeceptum*, and, in such form, created a version known as the *Regula recepta*.[14] Accepting this redaction strengthened the idea that the primary obligation of the Dominican *vita communis* is to formulate a community of love. The communal ideal was to live in harmony, and the significance of such harmony was that it revitalized Apostolic life and enabled a way of perfection mandated by Christ.

Accordingly, the text of the *Praeceptum* places the emphasis not so much on the value of obedience (as was the case with the Rule of Benedict) or on paraenetic-spiritual instructions (like the Rule of Basil), but rather on the communitarian spirit.[15] Indeed, the entire *Praeceptum* is deeply concerned with the regulation of the harmony of fraternal bonds, the value of communal practices for spiritual growth, the role of the *fratres* in correcting misbehaviour, the regulation of communal ownership, which was a prerequisite for embodying the Apostolic community, as well as with the value of the commonly practised discipline of the body and its needs.[16] In other words, the *Praeceptum* functioned to a great extent as a textual tool that moved the inner potential of a person to overcome his individuality and reach a more perfect state by conforming to a *communitas*.

The Dominicans appropriated this Rule in 1216, when a group of preachers, gathered around Dominic de Guzmán (c. 1170-1221), decided to pursue a *vita communis*. Initially, this group was organized in the region of Toulouse to root out the Cathar heresy.[17] Their acceptance of the Rule of

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[12] More on the significance of this line from the Acts in medieval monasticism: Schreiner 2002, 1-47. On the significance of this line in Humbert's Commentary: Schnakenberg 2020, 46-49.

[13] Expositio regulae, 56.

[14] On the textual tradition of the Rule, including insights into the variations concerning the opening lines: Schnakenberg 2020: 40-51. More extensively on the textual tradition see the classical study: Verheijen 1967.

[15] See in Redovnička pravila [Monastic rules], 102-179 (Rule of Basil); 251-300 (Rule of Benedict). On a more fraternal orientation cf. Schnakenberg 2020, 48-49, on the conceptions of unity, unanimity and uniformity, here: 245-258.

[16] Expositio regulae, 417-437.

[17] For the context: Melville 2016, 233-235.

Augustine came after Dominic's meeting with Pope Innocent III in 1215. The Pope advised Dominic to accept one of the already-approved rules, and not to inaugurate his own.[18] This attitude reflected the Curial tendency to reject new orders if they failed to accept the traditional norms.[19] Hence, the appropriation of the Rule of Augustine provided the Dominicans not only membership within the vast and ever-growing family of Augustine-attached religious communities, but also canonical validity.[20]

The chosen rule did not fully fit the Dominican purpose. A new community desired not only to live in enclosure, but also to continue preaching and pastoral care.[21] Their *Liber constitutionum* (1241) defined the Order's *propositum* as a salvific mission, grounded on the academically trained preaching: *cum ordo noster specialiter ob predicationem et animarum salutem ab initio noscatur institutus fuisse, et studium nostrum ad hoc debeat principaliter intendere, ut proximorum animabus possimus utiles esse.*[22] What the Dominicans introduced was the idea that monastic life should not serve one's own salvation; rather, it should bring salvation to everyone. This, of course, was already practised by earlier orders.[23] However, the Dominicans saw pastoral work as their primary goal, something that *had to* be practised to fulfil their vocation, and not merely something that *could* be practised by religious. An active life among people became essential; this ecclesial goal was now equalled with the monastic profession.

The Dominicans saw Augustine as a "great preacher",[24] but the specific arrangement that would balance conventual and active life was missing in the Rule. The Dominicans compensated this by issuing laws at their General Chapter, which regularly formulated prescriptions that provided concrete guidance on how to proceed with their pastoral activities.[25] These laws, however, did not change the fact that the fundamental and primordial norm of a new community (the Rule) did not offer a practical basis for the novel monastic life.

As such, as Humbert's introduction into the Commentary shows, there appeared a dissatisfaction with the Rule among some friars,[26] and a

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[18] See the chronicle of Jordan of Saxony: Libellus, 45-46. Cf.: Wesjohann 2012, 334-347.

[19] This was formulated as a law at the Fourth Lateran Council (1215). Constitutiones Concilii quarti Lateranensis, 62.

[20] Similarly: Schnakenberg 2020, 326.

[21] See: Cygler-Melville 2002, 426-427. On problems evolving from the Rule not fully fitting the Dominican identity: Schnakenberg 2020, 161-163.

[22] Liber constitutionum, 29.

[23] Cf. Melville 2016, 129, 131, 133.

[24] Libellus, 46.

[25] See in ACG I.

[26] Brett 1984, 119.

consequent initiative to change it. This was well-supported by the fact that, as we have seen, prior to accepting the Rule of Augustine, Dominic wished to confirm his own rule.[27] We are not familiar with its content, but the fact that the founder of the Order desired to write a specific rule provided the dissatisfied friars a good starting point in their claim to revise the normative standards.[28]

Tensions were articulated in a Papal letter dating in 1255. It shows that the Dominican Cardinal Hugh of St Cher, representing the dissatisfied friars, requested Papal permission to make a normative reform. He wanted to merge various elements from the Order's laws, usages, and the Rule into a new rule.[29] The initiative was approved, but it needed the support of the Order's authorities.[30] At this time the General Master was Humbert, who advocated a different stance. He defended the full value of the Rule, claiming that it allowed a friar to interiorize qualities, which could be transmitted into society by preaching.[31] Furthermore, in his other work, Humbert claimed that the Rule held a higher position than the constitutions in the hierarchy of laws,[32] suggesting his unwillingness to merge them into a single normative text of equal authority.

There is no indication that the legislative reform was ever pursued after Cardinal Hugh's initiative. Yet, Humbert, who as General Master was directly involved in the dispute, was aware of the problem the Rule could cause if its value were not adequately explained. Hence, he defended the Rule's adequacy by writing a Commentary. And within this very context, Humbert's views on quarrels and harmony gain additional value. By instructing the brethren about the dangers of disagreement, he was not only encouraging the conceptual attachment to the idea of "one heart and one mind", but was also moving to preserve the institutional stability of the Order, the stability which would be jeopardized were the disputes over the Rule to continue.

The preservation of harmony

Quarrelling and religious status

Humbert first explains that quarrelling is a demonic characteristic, which does not befit religious men.[33] Quarrelling, he continues, can be instigated by three motives: a desire to possess, lust (necessities of the flesh),

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[27] See the previous text.
[28] Cf. Brett 1984, 119-120.
[29] See in Brett 1984, 120; Cygler-Melville 2002, 425-426. Extensively: Schnakenberg 2020, 160-174.
[30] Cf. Brett 1984, 120.
[31] Expositio regulae, 48. Cf. Jerković 2025, 108.
[32] Expositio in constitutiones, 16.
[33] Expositio regulae, 482.

and pride.[34] On the other hand, the monastic state is an angelic state of fraternity, based on a *paterna dilectio*; it excludes the possession of things, builds itself on the mortification of carnal desires, and anticipates humility instead of pride.[35] Hence, the first necessity for preserving inter-personal peace is to foster an awareness that a religious state implies a community of love, which overcomes the material world. A person dwelling in a monastery must realize that his existence has to be detached from human needs (desires of body, comfort, and self-fulfilment) and strive to accomplish virtuousness by interiorizing *humilitas* and by abnegating the self.

Renunciation of property and of needs, together with chastity, a martyrization of the body, and humility, are all markers of virtuousness that can be regularly found in monastic texts.[36] By inserting them into the Commentary, Humbert makes it clear that the creation of a harmonious community of virtues[37] can be accomplished by relying on traditional edificatory tools. For the preservation of peace, each person in a monastery has to accept the norms of monastic virtuousness.

Apart from belonging to a standard repertoire of virtues, both renunciation of property and chastity were promoted as the core values of a monastic life by Augustine's Rule as well.[38] With that in mind, Humbert's emphasis on these very key features indicates that, in his view, the preservation of harmony rested on the interiorization of, especially, those traditional virtues, which were in line with the Augustinian version of the *vita perfectionis*.

Humbert then warns his brethren that disagreements take away from a man the signs of a divine service and the fruits of abstinences.[39] Hence, Humbert wants to show that quarrels are not only something inappropriate for those aiming to be Angel-like, but that they are also a practical obstacle in serving God. Monastic discipline, built on various abstinences, creates new martyrs, those who, specifically by practising those abstinences, co-suffer with Christ and, by depriving themselves of earthly matters, focus on divine service.[40] With that in mind, it is clear that Humbert wants to instil the meaning that quarrelling diminishes not only a

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[34] Expositio regulae, 483.

[35] Expositio regulae, 481-483.

[36] See various examples in e.g. ancient *verba seniorum*: Život i izreke [Life and sentences] or in medieval Dominican collection of exemplary lives: Vitae fratrum. On virtues in religious life: Pansters 2015, 99-124.

[37] Schnakenberg 2020, 295, 328, speaks of the "culture of virtues" or the "virtuous society".

[38] Regula Augustini, 418-420; 424-426.

[39] Expositio regulae, 483.

[40] On the image of the monastery as a place of martyrdom: Sonntag 2008, e.g. 77, 106.

person's more perfect status but also the very substance of monastic practises.

Humbert makes quarrelling a sinful category. He not only warns the brethren to abstain from quarrels to save themselves from sinning (cf. Sir 28,8), but also,on various occasions,implies the presence of sin in breaking Augustine's norms about the harmony.[41] This "culpabilization" of quarrelling gains significance when set in the broader context of Dominican attitudes towards sinning against the law. The Dominicans made a revolutionary change in understanding the religious law by declaring that their constitutions do not oblige under the guilt of sin.[42] The only times when the breaking of law means sinning is when the crime is committed out of contempt or when it is committed against the laws written as commands.[43] Hence, unlike the traditional view that equalled the breaking of law with sin,[44] the Dominicans saw the transgression of norms as a non-culpable category as long as it did not imply the willingness to commit the crime or contradict the *praecepta*. In the Commentary in general, Humbert opts for a view that in order to determine whether the Rule obliges under pain of mortal sin, it is necessary to use reasoning (common sense) and to place the text within its doctrinal context.[45] Yet, since he warns that quarrelling contains in itself sinning, he reinforces Augustine's law about maintaining harmony.[46] This indicates that Humbert's vital strategy of preserving the ideal of a harmonious community was to burden the conscience of his co-brethren more intensely, and not to relax it. This keeping of stability was based on an awareness that quarrelling does not simply mean to disagree, but rather that it carries devastating repercussions on the soul.

To maintain the ideal of harmony, Humbert found it necessary to "trans-temporalize" its value. Throughout the text, we find numerous quotations from the Scriptures, monastic hagiographic and paraenetic traditions, and classical (both pagan and Christian) authors.[47] This was, of course, a common method among Christian authors,providing their arguments with a sense of authenticity. What is remarkable is the quantity of Humbert's citations. Almost every line of his Commentary is supported

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[41] See e.g. Expositio regulae, 483-484, 488, 493; 499-507.

[42] Liber constitutionum, 29. More about this concept in Cygler 2001, 387-401.

[43] Liber constitutionum, 29.

[44] Cf. Füser 2000, 65, note 15.

[45] More details in: Schnakenberg 2020, 267-272, esp. 271.

[46] In the Expositio in constitutiones, 46, Humbert informs us that in the Dominican tradition, there was the view that not even the Rule (written as the *praeceptum*), obliged under the guilt of sin in all its segments. However, as we can see, in the Commentary Humbert advocates a stricter view on how Augustine's Rule obliges.

[47] Expositio regulae, 481-529. Brett 1984, 117-118. On Humbert's use of sources, a detailed account in: Schnakenberg 2020, 221-235.

by a reference to some source. In addition, it is evident that Humbert seeks to establish an abundant and balanced system of citations from both the Old and the New Testament,[48] with Christian and pagan traditions serving as additional argumentation. This method reflects Humbert's scholastic proficiency. However, this can also be understood as an attempt to place Augustine's *praecepta* in a broader and trans-temporal system of human values. By supporting his Commentary with a balanced system of Scriptural quotations, Humbert leaves the impression that Augustine's norms are rooted in the everlasting history of human salvation and that they have their support in both Prophetic and Evangelic morality. Furthermore, the frequent insertions of hagiographic *exempla*[49] are there to not only instruct, but to also imply that the values expressed in the Rule find support in lived monastic practice. Finally, the insertion of classical authors[50] is not a mere rhetorical device but a way of linking Augustine's *praecepta* with the ever-existing system of human wisdom.

In this way, Augustine's precepts on community became not only a guide for self-transcendence and the recreation of the Apostolic community; they became a way of embedding its adherents into the timeless and universal system of ethics and a more perfect way of conduct in general. The Dominican individual had to realize that not only was harmony Augustine's prime command, but that to also integrate a deep sense of the lasting quality of such an ideal.

Authority

The preservation of peace depended heavily on the stable relations between the superior and the community. Hence, Humbert indicates that disputes with the prelate are especially inappropriate, and that they should be considered a very great sin.[51] By making such a statement, Humbert not only adds additional burden to the conscience of the friars, but also affirms the superior's authority. Humbert's advocation of the prelate's authority is also seen in his strong support of Augustine's instruction that a superior, with whom the brethren are not allowed to quarrel, has the right to use harsh and even excessively strict words when correcting his subjects.[52]

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[48] Cf. Schnakenberg 2020, 222.

[49] See e.g. Expositio regulae, 482, 485, 490, 507. See: Schnakenberg 2020, 224-225.

[50] He especially cites Seneca: Expositio regulae, 493, 503, 506, 522. On his use of classical authors see: Schnakenberg 2020, 230-231.

[51] Expositio regulae, 484.

[52] Expositio regulae, 514-517. On the principle of the superior's harshness in the Rule: Regula Augustini, 434-435. It must be clear that Humbert's discourse about the superior's strictness varies throughout the Commentary. Depending on the situation, he advocates a gentler or a more strict practice of authority. On this: Schnakenberg 2020, 279-281.

Humbert's defence of the idea of a strict superior shows his attempt to achieve stability by instilling a deep sense of compliance among the brethren and mobilising their acceptance of the value of a traditional monastic authority.[53] This is especially significant given the fact that the Dominicans introduced a more balanced authority system. As their constitutions show, it was not only the superiors that participated in governance but the general brethren as well.[54] Moreover, within the disciplinary sphere, the brethren even possessed the right to evaluate the superior's work, admonish him, and even report his misbehaviour to higher instances.[55] In addition, in his Commentary on the constitutions, Humbert considered the inclusion of the brethren in decision-making as something that made his Order wiser in comparison with the other orders.[56] Yet, in commenting the disharmony, he omits a discussion concerning the brethren's rights and authority. Of course, this does not mean that Humbert suddenly changed his mind about the constitutional role of the friars. Rather, it seems that in a delicate moment, one in which there was a fraction wanting to change the normative fundaments,[57] he decided that it would be better to focus on a more tradition-affirmative argumentation to prevent quarrels. In other words, Humbert's discourse on quarrels, promoting the more authoritative role of a superior, did not display an ignorance of constitutional rights but was more a strategy of using tradition for the stabilization of Order.

Humbert legitimized the superior's supremacy by showing numerous examples of harsh authority, from the Old Testament' Patriarchs to Christ.[58] He wished to mobilize the brethren' compliance by invoking a sense of primordiality of such an authority. Hence, quarrelling was to be prevented not only by omitting the constitutional role of the friars, but also by connecting the Dominican inner-monastic relational structures with the Divinely authenticated model of power.

To affirm the prelate's supremacy, Humbert claims that the superior should not humble himself by asking for forgiveness, not even were he to cross the boundaries of strictness in rebuking the friars.[59] The prelate,

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[53] In the monastic tradition, the concept of authority rested on the idea of the superior having full power over the brethren, while the latter were obliged to obediently fulfill the former's commands. On the concepts of monastic authority in early medieval tradition and the relations between the superior and the brethren (who were continuously trying to acquire a more powerful position): Constable 1982, 189-210.

[54] These had their representatives in the Provincial and the General Chapter, who had the right to participate in disciplinary, legislative, and administrative duties on equal ground with the superiors. Liber constitutionum, 54-62.

[55] Liber constitutionum, 45-46.

[56] Expositio in constitutiones, 58, 61-62.

[57] See the previous chapter.

[58] Expositio regulae, 516-519.

[59] Expositio regulae, 516.

indeed, can ask for forgiveness if he considers it wise, but only in specific circumstances (in other words, Humbert opposes this practice from becoming customary).[60] By advocating this view, Humbert formulates the prelate's status in accordance with the Augustinian view of leadership, the appropriate prelate is the one to whom the obedience is owed and who has the right to use strictness;[61] yet, the prelate does not conform to the same norms of self-humbling as do the others.[62] Humbert explains this by explicitly claiming that not every humility is a virtue.[63] The superior's self-humbling is not virtuous because it contradicts his state and the natural order. [64] All the more, continues Humbert, such humbling would instigate contempt for the prelate's office and decrease the virtuousness of the community since it would weaken the community's obedience.[65] Hence, to preserve stability, it is necessary to more strongly promote the quality of the friar's obedience and to dispense the prelate from a regular performance of virtuous self-humbling.

Humbert legitimizes the natural character of strictness by reminding the brethren that God chastises those He loves more strictly and that He is always harsher towards the chosen ones.[66] Accordingly, the prelate, representing the natural order by embodying Christ's authority, upholds discipline not out of malice but out of *benevolentia*.[67] Hence, by following God's example of harshness, the prelate shows his intentions of good will. Clearly, to preserve the ideal of harmony by preventing quarrels, Humbert formulated a vision of a prelate who chastises out of love and made the image of a superior more divinized. Unlike the constitutions, which limit the prelate's power, Humbert turns towards the empowerment of the "charisma of office", which was more in accordance with the traditional monastic vision of the superior being the *vicarius Christi*.[68]

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[60] Expositio regulae.

[61] Regula Augustini, 434-435.

[62] Expositio regulae, 516-517.

[63] Expositio regulae, 516.

[64] Expositio regulae, 517-518.

[65] Expositio regulae, 519. A more detailed account on obedience in Humbert's Commentary in: Schnakenberg 2020, 262-267, on the role of obedience in keeping unanimity: 266.

[66] Expositio regulae, 522.

[67] Expositio regulae, 522.

[68] The idea of the superior being the *vicarius Christi* is clearly seen in the Benedicti regula, 21. In the Regula Augustini, 434, we find a similar idea: *Praeposito tamquam patri oboediatur, honore seruato, ne in illo offendatur deus*. On the concept of the "charisma of office": Weber 1978, 1140.

Justice and performances

Humbert then turns towards the proper ways of ending quarrelling and attaining justice. He claims that, in accordance with Augustine's precept, quarrels must be ended as soon as possible.[69] The author explains that any postponement may result in mutual hatred, make the soul guilty of murder, or lead to a physical confrontation.[70] Clearly, Humbert desires to accomplish harmony by additionally warning the brothers that, while the natural state of religious implies a community of love, quarrels serve as weapons of the sin of murder and violence. Apparently, the first thing necessary for the restoration of peace was to promote Augustine's antipodal love-murder imagery in defining the communitarian relations.

Humbert then instructs the brethren on what to do when one suffers from the pain caused by quarrelling. He states that two things are necessary: satisfaction on the part of the offender and forgiveness on the part of the offended.[71] Satisfaction must be rendered by every offender (for it is Augustine's mandate).[72] Hence, Humbert finds it necessary to additionally burden the conscience by insisting that the Rule is not merely an instruction but a command.[73] Furthermore, Humbert reminds the readership that such a mandate is connected to obedience. Since he indicates that satisfaction cannot be postponed by the will of the friar,[74] Humbert wishes to make the brethren deeply aware that inter-personal harmony depends on subduing the mind to the norms standing above the self.

The satisfaction was to act as a healing balm, repairing the spiritual pain.[75] Such a curative effect belongs to the wider perception of the monastery as being a place for the spiritually weak.[76] Yet, in this specific context the function of such a motive was to support the necessity of preserving harmony by transforming the offending friars from sinners to spiritual doctors. While the breaking of the norm of harmony implied sinning, the making of satisfaction acted to transform the transgressor into an active helper of spiritual growth. The transgressor underwent a cycle of personal transformation, implying the U-turn from the mental abyss in which he falls by murdering the soul of a co-friar to a repentant individual that cures. Hence, the acceptability of bringing about satisfaction was built upon the idea that the restoration of peace provides an opportunity

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[69] Expositio regulae, 485, 488. See in the Rule: Regula Augustini, 433.

[70] Expositio regulae, 487.

[71] Expositio regulae, 488. See in the Rule: Regula Augustini, 433.

[72] Expositio regulae, 488-489.

[73] See the previous text.

[74] Expositio regulae, 490.

[75] Expositio regulae, 490.

[76] See: Melville 2016, 332.

to perpetuate Christ's call to conversion (Mk 1:15) and Christ's command to love one's neighbour (Jn 15:12).

Humbert explains that such curative satisfaction can be made *per verba* (by asking for forgiveness), *per corporis humilitatem* (by prostrating before the offended friar) and *per obsequia* (by serving the offended friar).[77] As Humbert suggests, not every offender is required to make all three satisfactions in every case, nor is every offender bound to the same degree. What determines the extent of satisfaction is the very nature and gravity of the offence.[78] Here we see that inter-personal peace depends on the rational approach to justice. Justice must be made in accordance to a measure of guilt; it has to be achieved by assuring the brethren that the satisfaction fits the fault. Likewise, justice is connected to virtuousness. The self-humbling by asking forgiveness, the prostrated body showing humility, and the service to the offended which implies Christ's message of serving and not being served (Mt 20:28) all demonstrate that stability rests on integrating the likeness to Christ into the process of reconciliation.

Justice based on rationality is also seen in the instruction that it is not necessary to make the satisfaction in person. If the offended is not present in a monastery, it is sufficient for the offender to make the satisfaction in mind and to have the good will to satisfy.[79] In other words, what matters most is to make a rational arrangement of justice by providing the offender adequate means of exculpation in different situations. In that way, Humbert burdens the conscience by demanding immediate satisfaction (in accordance with Augustine's mandate) but, at the same time, he assures his co-friars that the monastic system of justice is rationally adaptable and that it will always find a way to enable self-purification and the remission of sin.

Yet, who is entitled to define the measure of satisfaction? Humbert first implies that it is the offended friar himself. However, the offended party is not free in his judgment; the community must intervene in cases where the rational demands concerning the satisfaction are exceeded and engage some of its members in making the judgement.[80] Clearly, the process of restoring harmony primarily concerns the parties involved, whose actions must be scrutinized and evaluated by the community. In other

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[77] Expositio regulae, 490-491.

[78] Expositio regulae, 491.

[79] Expositio regulae, 491.

[80] Expositio regulae, 491: *Quod si offensus petat nimis, potest sufficere offendenti satisfacere secundum arbitrium boni viri, quamvis laudabile sit plus debito pro pace fratris facere in hoc casu.* It seems that the principle of communal involvement rested on the traditional monastic right to provide advice to a prelate. On monastic decision making: Felten 2013, 27-46.

words, the preservation of harmony also depends on shared responsibility and a system of constant checks in the enforcement of justice.

Finally, Humbert indicates that those unwilling to ask for forgiveness are not only far from salvation, but that they also have no place in a monastery.[81] This argument, built upon Augustine's line in the Rule,[82] does not provide a concrete solution for dealing with such friars. Yet, here it serves as a powerful tool for impacting the conscience. Such argumentation diminishes the very substance of the existence of non-repentant friars and, by grounding its validation in Augustine's *praecepta*, denies the value of their vocation. In that way, harmony is achieved by perpetuating the sense of unworthiness among the unrepentant.

And, while the offender is obliged (under the guilt of sin) to make the satisfaction, the offended must forgive. Humbert explains this obligation by invoking the Christian doctrine of forgiveness – he reminds us that Christ determined such a law by forgiving even those that crucified him.[83] By following this law, the friars remain good Christians and distance themselves from the Jewish law of retribution.[84] Besides, continues Humbert, it is the obligation of saints to forgive and, also in following Christ, to do good even to their enemies.[85] Arguments based primarily on the fundamental morality of Christ tend to preserve inter-personal peace by instilling the conviction that the monastic individual must embody Christianity in its full ethical purity. Stability is, evidently, connected to a successfully installed sense of a Christ-like individuality.

Inter-personal peace also depends on the installment of eschatological fear. Humbert adds that those that do not forgive will, consequently, not be forgiven by God.[86] This damnation of a soul is, evidently, also an element devised to burden the conscience – and the targeted conscience is now that of a man who has been spiritually wounded. It is not only the offender who becomes a sinner if he fails to make satisfaction, but also the offended if he did not forgive. The conscience and a dark vision of the afterlife became a means to reestablish communitarian stability. The burdening of the conscience was such an important element of stability that Humbert insisted on forgiving even if the offender did not make the satisfaction. In such cases, Humbert required only interior forgiveness from the injured party, in order to avoid the sin of refusing to forgive.[87] Hence,

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[81] Expositio regulae, 503-504, 506.
[82] Regula Augustini, 434.
[83] Expositio regulae, 493.
[84] Expositio regulae, 493.
[85] Expositio regulae, 493.
[86] Expositio regulae, 493-494.
[87] Expositio regulae, 495.

stability could also be accomplished by cleansing the *forum internum* and creating a *claustrum animae* within the offended party.[88]

Humbert then makes a distinction between the public and private offence (the one not known to others). The former requires satisfaction before the community, while the latter only before the offended.[89] The public pronunciation of guilt was common in a monastery. The Dominicans practiced it daily at the ritualistic chapter of faults, the assembly at which the brothers would confess their faults.[90] The significance of this chapter was the public awareness of someone's guilt and the communal involvement in the process of repentance. The transgressor against the norms had to deeply feel his shame and guilt by being exposed to others, while the community had to take the responsibility of the co-friar's soul by proclaiming his faults.

The public satisfaction after quarrelling belonged to a performative repertoire of repentance. It included a ritual in which the offended party publicly demonstrated forgiveness by uplifting the prostrated offender or, if the offender required forgiveness *per verba*, by saying: *Dominus parcat vobis; vel: Parco vobis; vel: Satisfactum est mihi, vel similia*.[91] This was not only a ritual of forgiveness, it was also a way of assuring the others that the disturbance of harmony had come to an end. The community, which during the quarrel of its members did not function as "one heart and one mind", now witnessed the reparation of such a state and was offered the feeling of reconstitution of the ideal. Hence, stability required ritualistic satisfaction if the quarrel was public, and this ritual functioned as a symbolical manifestation of the natural order.

However, as previously noted, this performance could be carried out in private were the quarrel not known in public. Humbert evidently finds it better to save the offender's dignity by not exposing his guilt. He obviously thinks that it is better not to burden the community with private quarrels, i.e. to expose it to its dangerous effects if not necessary. Here, we once again see Humbert's rationality; namely, the private ritual, primarily fixated onto the purification of the conscience, did not require a public ritual because the conscience was not to be overburdened. The goal of a satisfaction was peace, and if it could be done by a private enforcement of justice, then the conscience could rest, purified.

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[88] The "cloister of a soul" was a term used in a contemporary literature for a religious individual that strove for perfection by working on his inner purity more individually and in more direct communication with God. See: Bauer 1973. On conscience: Breitenstein 2016, 19-55.

[89] Expositio regulae, 492.

[90] Liber constitutionum, 55. On the chapter of faults shortly: Füser 2000. pp. 69-70. On the Dominican chapter of faults and Humbert's commentaries: Schnakenberg 2020, 289-292.

[91] Expositio regulae, 495.

So far, Humbert has been dealing with a situation in which one party causes harm to another. But he also refers to a situation in which both parties are equally guilty of offence. Humbert sees a reparation of this state not only in mutual forgiveness but also in behaving virtuously before each other. Both parties had to show kindness, submit themselves to the other, pray for the other, edify the other in goodness, serve the other with love, and demonstrate humility.[92] These instructions can be, once again, understood as the *topoi* of monastic edification; yet, here they also serve to mobilize in the readers the sense that the state of harmony is not an earthly category but a spiritual one, which can be achieved by equally spiritualized behaviour. A mutual offence is a matter that can be efficiently solved by transfiguring the friars into the symbols of a more perfect human state.

Silence and speech

Humbert's Commentary reflects on the value of monastic silence. Strict silence has been considered to be an important means of self-discipline from the very beginnings of monasticism. Such demands evolved from the view that inappropriate speech could result in spiritual harm.[93] In addition, silence was a way of following the example of Christ and the early martyrs in their endurance before a judge,[94] i.e., it reflected one's readiness to emanate a heroic and saintly suffering for God. The Dominicans incorporated the norms about strict silence in their constitutions.[95] Humbert also claimed that speech was a dangerous instrument, because it could transmit sinful thoughts.[96] However, since the Dominicans were the order of preachers, they understood that speech had an edifying value, and that it has to be used in a virtuous way and not be completely eradicated.[97]

In the Commentary, Humbert claims that the mouth is an unstable organ, capable of both good and evil,[98] and that if not used appropriately, it would cause great harm to a person. While thieves and arsonists harm others from a material standpoint, the tongue harmed the inner person, it went straight "to the bone of virtue and broke it".[99] Clearly, Humbert not

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[92] Expositio regulae, 497-498.

[93] On early monasticism cf. Diem 2010, 99, 100. On the Higher Middle Ages: Walker Bynum 1982, 44-45.

[94] Cf. Krešić Nacevski 2025 [in print].

[95] Liber constitutionum, 37-38.

[96] Expositio in constitutiones, 116.

[97] Jerković 2025, 111-112. By claiming so, the Dominicans were, to a large extent, following the tradition of the regular canons, who saw "silence as preparation for fruitful discourse between men". Walker Bynum 1982, 44.

[98] Expositio regulae, 509.

[99] Expositio regulae, 489.

only expresses the traditional monastic view of speech, but he also intensifies its dangerous effects. To preserve the ideal of harmony, he more radically emphasized the awareness that the mouth holds the potential to produce sin and to diminish virtue.

As such, the best way to avoid quarrel is to discipline the self completely by not speaking at all, or avoiding speaking to a quarrelsome person.[100] But if a friar gets involved into dispute or if his adversary attacks him verbally, Humbert advises not responding to provocation. The best course of action is complete silence and withdrawal. Should complete silence be impossible, then the attacked friar should not respond with harsh words. He should not allow for the quarrel to continue and his body should take a posture of showing humility (and not aggression).[101] Clearly, Humbert's idea is that in order to preserve harmony, the attacked friar must be a symbol of virtuousness – his silence, meek words, and humbled body should show patience and endurance in humility. Hence, silence, or meek speech if complete silence is impossible, became not only the self-disciplinary practice; but they were functionalized as a means of reestablishing the ideal of a virtuous state.

In the necessity of speaking, the mouth of the friar should emanate the virtue of wisdom.[102] All the more, Humbert connects such wise speaking with justice. In his view, a mouth which produces well-prepared words and does not induce disagreement makes a religious a just man. This is especially important since, in that way, the mouth becomes an organ of the Holy Spirit.[103] Evidently, for Humbert, it is not only the self-disciplinary silence that provides a better state, but also the just speech, which retained the ideal of harmony by turning a person into a receiver and meditator of the Spirit.

Appropriate use of speech is also that which satisfies the injured party. In accordance with the idea of the healing effect of satisfaction,[104] for Humbert speech can produce goodness if it is used as medicine.[105] The mouth had to be not (only) restrained, but given a greater purpose. The harmony of the human community – the one that, because of its sinful nature cannot get rid of speech completely – depends on finding a way to redirect the capacity to sin into a capacity to heal.

Humbert continues by explaining that a good use of the mouth includes a confession of faith (since it provides salvation), a confession of

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[100] Expositio regulae, 484-485.
[101] On all these methods: Expositio regulae, 485-486.
[102] Expositio regulae, 511. On the similarity in tradition of the regular canons: Walker Bynum 1982, 45.
[103] Expositio regulae, 512.
[104] See the previous sub-chapter.
[105] Expositio regulae, 490.

sins (leading to absolution), prayer (it produces spiritual goods), a correction of faults (salutary effect), the edification of others, helping others by giving advice or offering comfort, and praises to God.[106] Humbert indicates that these uses of the mouth are good since they take into consideration the spiritual progress of the friar himself (confession, prayer), the progress of one's neighbour (correction, edification, advice), and a Divine appraisal. Humbert's argumentation is rather intelligently devised. The third one, concerning the lauding of God, is completely natural in a discourse of a religious author, and this argument was textually integrated to affirm the contemplative purpose of monastic life. The first two arguments, the spiritual effects on the self and others, however, do not only relate to the edificatory desires of monastic life, but also to a specific Dominican purpose. As indicated earlier, the Dominicans saw their mission in pastoral terms – they had to form a neighbour, and – as Humbert claimed – this edification could be achieved after the preacher had been trained in monastic life.[107] Hence, the goodness of words, coming out of an edificatory effect onto both the enclosed individual and his neighbour, here aligns with the Dominican *propositum vitae*. In that context, Humbert's message is that harmony is sustainable not only if quarrels are avoided by silence, but also if the mouth is used in the service of the Order's purpose.

Prayer and love

Humbert then turns to the value of prayer and the emotion of love. Concerning the former, Augustine prescribed the obligation of the conflicted parties to frequently pray for each other, together with forgiveness.[108] Augustine's idea was to attain harmony by directing the spiritual capacities of the brothers towards a regular mutual intercession. Humbert adds to this mandate the instruction that prayers cannot be efficient if repentance and mercy are lacking.[109] Here Humbert targets the inner state of the brethren; he desires to establish harmony by invoking a willingness to contribute to the spiritual progress of others. Harmony becomes possible if a desire for it is present within those involved in disputes, and if they possess the inner guilt of remaining in sin if they do not forgive.

The efficiency of prayer also depends on several other factors: the pure intention of the heart and the presence of virtues in the praying man (of charity, prudence, perseverance, abstinence), a stability of mind and a

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[106] Expositio regulae, 510-511.
[107] See in the previous chapters. On the Dominican purpose in the context of monastic ideals see also Hinnebusch 1966, 119-143. On the relation between self-training and the purpose of preaching see the Humbert's De eruditione.
[108] Regula Augustini, 433-434.
[109] Expositio regulae, 499.

lack of desire while praying, and the right postures of the body.[110] Here Humbert remains loyal to his previous views; harmony depends on the realization of virtues, and such community must also be demonstrated during prayer. Furthermore, such collective virtuousness depends not only on the purity of the conscience, but also on the adequate balance between the inner state and external disposition, which is clear from the instruction that the body must demonstrate virtues of humility and readiness to repent (by kneeling, uplifting hands, striking one's chest during prayer).[111] Finally, prayer becomes efficient when a person is released from any desire.[112] So, harmony is accomplished not only by the frequency of prayer, as Augustine mandated, but also by more strictly disciplining the self in mind and body.

      Humbert's Commentary then looks at Augustine's command that monastic love must be spiritual, and not carnal.[113] Humber uses the line of this Rule's as a starting point to explain not only the significance of emotions in retaining harmony, but to also define what love is. He first claims that carnal love may originate from the affections of the flesh, from the affections for relatives or from love for one's own flesh.[114] These, however, are not relevant for true religious perfection. Only a virtuous love is the right emotion.[115] It encompasses an emotion that evolves from charity, a state of the heart realised by the workings of a Holy Spirit.[116] In other words, Humbert defines a monastic love as the emotion instigated by a mutual charitable affection, and as an emotion belonging not to the person but to the Spirit. Proper love is the one that is given as a gift and "diffused" by a Spirit, after the conscience has been cleansed.

      Apart from defining love as something that must be provoked by self-purification, Humbert claims that love must never be based on reciprocity. Love is not something demanded for oneself, but an emotion that always has to be directed towards the other.[117] And when attained in such a way, love becomes the state of the fulfilled law of friendship.[118] Accordingly, monastic love must not be corporal but corporate – it has to integrate a feeling of love for the spiritual body, within which all the *membra* love each other, and not oneself.[119]

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[110] Expositio regulae, 502.

[111] Expositio regulae, 501.

[112] Expositio regulae, 501.

[113] Regula Augustini, 435. Dominican version: Expositio regulae, 523.

[114] Expositio regulae, 524-525.

[115] Expositio regulae, 525.

[116] Expositio regulae, 525.

[117] Expositio regulae, 527, and generally: 523-529.

[118] Here Humbert combines his theology with Cicero's ideas of friendship: Expositio regulae, 526.

[119] Expositio regulae, 523.

Finally, spiritual love is the genuine love emanating from Christ's way of loving the Apostles, and the way which directs humankind towards spiritual goods.[120] With that in mind, Humbert's idea is to instil into the brethren the idea that to love means to imitate Christ-like affection for others. And this affection is not self-fulfilling; it has to direct others towards a higher cause and to enable the community in general to reach heavenly delights.

Hence, monastic love implies three characteristics: it is a virtue given by the Spirit if the conscience is without sin; it is an emotion given to a neighbour; and it is a primordial feeling since it originates in Christ. From such discourse, it is clear that, for Humbert, stability and harmony could be accomplished by realising an emotional community, a type of a social organization encompassing a group of people that share the same experience of affections which are pre-defined and regulated by the same literature.[121] Such a strategy can be understood as a rather idealised one, but it is completely logical; it rests on the idea that harmony is itself an abstract emotional connection based on "one heart and one mind", and the attainment of such a state must be accomplished by appropriately mobilising the emotional capacities of the Dominican individuals.

Furthermore, such a strategy is based on the understanding that the emotion of love must be the export product of each individual. It must not be preserved inside the self, but oriented towards the other. In other words, the final target is not the receiver of the Spirit (an individual blessed with the gift of love), but their neighbour. The one receiving the love is only the transitory port, from which the love must be transferred onto the co-friars. Such an understanding of love is set within a much larger context of the Augustinian spirituality. C. Walker Bynum already noticed that the 12th century regular canons (who were a monastic group dwelling under the Rule of Augustine) had made a paradigmatic shift by insisting not on the edification of the self (as was the case in the early medieval monasticism), but on exporting the results of the monastic training and of the spiritual experience onto the other.[122] As indicated, the neighbour became the central objective of the emotional build-up in Humbert's Commentary as well. This confirms that he followed the paradigm of spirituality devised by the regular canons, which perfectly fit the pastoral purpose of the Order of preachers. Humbert's advocacy of such a paradigm, however, was present not only as a spiritual conception, but as a strategy of keeping peace as well. The initially purely spiritual doctrine based on Augustine's commands was now utilized to block the communitarian in-

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[120] Expositio regulae, 524.
[121] Cf. Rosenwein 2006, 25-26 (and the entire study).
[122] Extensively in: Walker Bynum 1982, 22-106.

stability. Hence, Humbert's Commentary on love became a theology of functional emotionality.

Conclusion

The intention of this paper has not been to provide a systematic view of the Dominican understanding of Saint Augustine's ideas. Rather, by scrutinizing Humbert's Commentary, I simply wished to emphasise the potential of studying the issue of quarrelling in *vita religiosa*. The Commentary seemed a good starting point since it connected the ancient ideals of religious authenticity and its medieval reception. In that context, we could see that the ancient Rule of Augustine was utilised as a platform on which the new conceptions of harmony and quarrelling were formulated. Hence, Augustine was appropriated as both the legislator of a more perfect life and the authority for devising an authentic system of thinking about quarrelling and its place among the religious individual, his community and the Divine sphere.

The value of Humbert's commentaries on quarrelling evolves from the fact that they indicate what was needed to maintain discipline in a monastery. They showed which phenomena and which ways of experiencing sin, guilt, forgiveness, authority, virtues, and self-correction were seen in the mid-13th century Dominican order as efficient tools to make a group of individuals non-conflicting and affectively connected. They also showed Humbert's textual strategies, i.e. his functionalization of the written word, to accomplish such goals.

The crucial point was the conception of "one heart and one mind", i.e. the realization of the Apostolic ideal of emotional harmony. Accordingly, quarrelling was condemned as an antipodal feature and formulated as a sinful category. Hence, the first thing that was necessary was that the brethren accept the idea that quarrelling was more than disagreement; it was the manifestation of the human inclination towards a culpable state. In that way, Humbert's significant strategy in the preservation of discipline rested on heavily burdening the conscience by instilling in it a sinful guilt. Such pressure was further enhanced by promoting the idea, based directly on Augustine's belief, that by inducing a quarrel, a person kills his conventual neighbour.

Humbert's disciplinary technology empowered a sense of a traditional authority. For the maintenance of discipline, Humbert saw it necessary to strengthen the hierarchical disciplinary power and leave aside the Dominican proto-democratic institutions. This strategy also instilled the idea that satisfaction and forgiveness, accompanied by private or public performances of exculpation, were instruments with which justice was enforced. The sense of a just community did not imply only adequate pu-

nitive measures, but a corporate feeling that rituals of satisfaction and forgiveness restore the idealised community and the purity of self.

Humbert's disciplinary technology promoted conventional monastic virtuousness. It was necessary for the brethren to accept the notion of belonging to a community of virtues by interiorizing them and by demonstrating them performatively. Here, the brethren had to accept the special value of silence; this traditional monastic self-disciplinary practice became a strong tool for preventing and healing quarrels. Furthermore, Humbert thought it necessary to promote the virtue of "good speech", which was equalled with wisdom. The brethren had to realise that their verbalization of thoughts had to produce an edifying message. In such an imagery of virtuousness, words were envisioned as a cure for one's neighbour, simultaneously making the speaker not a sinner but a converted spiritual doctor.

In addition, Humbert's means of rooting out quarrelling rested on turning the Dominican convent into a praying and emotional community. The brethren had to accept that a religious individual reaches God not by keeping the contemplative experience for himself, but by exteriorising his love and by giving it to his neighbour (by praying for the other and by loving him). And exactly this type of community, mandated but not explicated by Augustine, became a crucial aim of Humbert's disciplinary technology. It was devised as a framework of forming a Dominican type of a cloistered individuality. Such individuality was a kind of self that had to everlastingly dwell in a state of limbo between self-perfection and self-abnegation, a self that had to accept the internal struggle between the desire to make oneself a better religious and the need to deny oneself by disseminating love to others in the community.

And, finally, we must recall that Humbert's Commentary was conceived as a reaction to the potential instability within the Order. Within that context, it is clear that the brethren had to accept the idea that retaining Augustine's mandate about not quarrelling was not only a way to preserve the spiritual ideal or a way to use that ideal to burden the conscience, but also a way to strengthen the Order's resistance to crises. In other words, the acceptability of the ideal rested on its multifunctionality, i.e., on the capacity to transfigure its utility with regard to the brethren's spiritual, practical, and constitutional needs.

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