23

THE COMMANDERS OF THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION DURING OCTAVIAN'S CAMPAIGN IN ILLYRICUM (35–33 BC)

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Abstract. – The works of Greco-Roman writers contain little information about the representatives of the local aristocracy who led the indigenous communities during Octavian's campaign in Illyricum (35–33 BC). We will use prosopographic analysis to try to understand what the internal organization of the indigenous communities or alliances was like. A panegyric written in honor of Octavian's legate, M. V. Messalla, potentially hides the name of an Iapodian leader. This is Domator, who is associated with the Iapodian community of the Arupini, whose military skills Appian has great respect for. However, during the period of the Octavian wars, there are two names that particularly stand out – the commanders from the Delmataean alliance, Verso and Testimus. Thanks to Appian, we know that the aforementioned Delmataean commanders led two armies, which points to the existence of a complex organization of the Delmataean alliance. Through the analysis of the military operations near Promona, Sinotium, and Setovia, we get a new perspective of the commanders of the indigenous communities.

Key words. – Octavian, Illyricum, Iapodes, Arupini, Domator, Delmatae, Delmataean alliance, Verso, Testimus.

Introduction

In the period between the capture of Gentius (168/167 BC) and the beginning of Bato's uprising (6 AD), narrative sources provide very little information about the leaders of the indigenous communities in Illyricum. We can only speculate about why these sources were silent. However, there was certainly no hegemon or commander that lived during this period who would have inspired the Romans like Viriathus did in Hispania or Vercingetorix did in Gaul. This does not mean that during these 160 years

the Romans did not wage wars in the part of the Balkans that they designated as Illyricum. The main obstacle to the Romans in achieving their imperial ambitions was the alliances of indigenous communities. We must not forget that Polybius clearly indicated that some of the indigenous communities were also Roman allies, such as the Daorsi.[1] The hegemonic aspirations of the Delmatae towards the Daorsi and the Issaean colonies on the coast were probably the reason for the first documented Roman conflict with the Delmatae.[2] Thanks to classical writers such as Polybius, Strabo, Florus, Frontinus, Appian, Cassius Dio, Eutropius, and Orosius, we know that the Roman consuls and high officials Gaius Marcius Figulus, Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum, Lucius Caecilius Metellus, Gaius Cosconius, Quintus Cornificius, Aulus Gabinius, Asinius Pollio, Titus Statilius Taurus, Agrippa, and Octavian himself fought against the Delmatae.[3] A similar situation exists with the Iapodes, against whom Gaius Sempronius Tuditanus, Publius Licinius, Decimus Junius Brutus Albinus, Marcus Helvius, Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, and, again, Octavian himself fought.[4] We also know that consul Fulvius Flaccus successfully waged war against the Ardiaei and the Pleraei in 135 BC, as did Gaius Julius Caesar against the Pirustae.[5]

    The list of names of Roman legates who fought in the eastern Adriatic (later subsequently Dalmatia) is quite long. On the other hand, until Octavian's campaign of 35–33 AD, the name of a only one leader (*Aepulo*) of the indigenous communities from the eastern Adriatic had not been preserved. The cause is the interest of Roman authors in specific persons.[6] Various magistrates waged war against the indigenous communities until 35 BC, but after 35 BC the main wars were led by Octavian and Tiberius themselves, who would become emperors after their success in Illyricum. Sources regarding their campaigns in Illyricum, such as Appian or Cassius Dio, date back to the period of Antoninus or Severus, when the reign of Augustus was considered the peak of Roman imperialism.[7] Even in the

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[1] Polyb. 32.9.

[2] Milivojević 2021, 62.

[3] App. *Ill*. 11. 30–33; Strab. 7.5.5; Liv. *Per*. 47; Flor. 2.25; Front. *Strat*. 3.6.2; [Aur. Vict.] *De vir. ill*. 44.4–5; Ampel. 19.11; Steph. Byz. *Ethn*. 216; Eutrop. 4.23; Eutrop. 6.1.4; Oros. 5.23.23; Caes. (Hirt.) *BAlex*. 42–47; App. *Ill*. 25.71; Flor. 2.25; Hor. *Carm*. 2.1.14–16. Serv. *Comm*. 3.88. 4.1; App. *Ill*. 25–38; Dio. 49.38.

[4] Front. *Strat*. 2.5.28; App. *Ill*. 10; Liv. *Per*. 59; Liv. 43.5.3; Dio 49.34.2; App. *Ill*. 18–21.

[5] App. *Ill*. 10; Caes. *BGall*. 3.9–5.1; Caes. *BGall*. 5.1.5–6.

[6] Woolf states that the majority of stories about barbarians originate from the time of the conquests of Caesar, Pompey, and Augustus, when the territorial expansion of Rome was the most rapid. The same author sees the great influence of Greek scholars on the creation of narratives about barbarians who brought Hellenistic traditions to Rome (Woolf 2011, 60–62). Sources from later periods largely used the texts of authors from the late Republic and even adopted their methodology.

[7] Šašel Kos, in her analysis of Appian's *Illyrike*, cites that one of Appian's main motivations for writing Roman history was his admiration for the monarchy and his desire to explain

narratives of Augustus' contemporaries, we can notice that Tiberius is addressed differently according to his military success in the *Bellum Pannonicum* as compared to the *Bellum Batonianum*.[8] In the period when Tiberius was still not recognized as Augustus' successor, the leaders of the indigenous communities were not treated as enemies worth mentioning. On the other hand, while Tiberius led the Roman army against the rebels in Illyricum in 6–9 AD, he was already officially Augustus' successor and had *maius imperium*. This could be the reason why classical authors preserved the names of some less important local leaders from Bato's uprising, such as *Scenobardus*.[9] In addition, one of the reasons why we have more information about the commanders of local alliances or communities from the time of Octavian's and Tiberius' campaigns is that we have direct or indirect testimonies from participants in the events themselves. For example, Appian extensively uses Octavian's autobiography, which has not been preserved. Appian himself mentions this in some places in his work.[10] We learn most about Tiberius' two campaigns from the works of his officer Velleius Paterculus, and Cassius Dio, the imperial legate in Dalmatia and Pannonia Superior.[11] Although he lived 200 years after the *Bellum Batonianum*, Dio was a legate in the provinces where these events took place. Therefore, he certainly used written sources, which enabled him to leave us certain information about the commanders or chiefs who led the rebels.

Domator – a real or a fictitious leader?

It is obvious that the political discourse towards Illyricum changed after the Battle of Philippi (42 BC). Octavian had to repair his military reputation and convince his soldiers that he was just as good a commander as Mark Antony.[12] He also saw the military campaign in Illyricum as a good opportunity to wage a war for conquest, because his previous military career had been built on civil wars. The personal ambitions of the future emperor certainly resulted in his campaign in Illyricum (35–33 BC) being much better documented than earlier military operations led by other by magistrates with *proconsular imperium* consuls (with some exceptions like Tuditanus).

However, the oldest potential testimony about a legate from Octavian's campaign does not directly refer to Octavian. A panegyric in honor of

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the Roman rise to supreme power in terms of its benefits for the whole world (Šašel Kos 2005, 45).

[8] Domić Kunić 2006, 102; Džino, Domić Kunić 2013, 162–163; Kovács 2014, 28; Šačić Beća 2019, 241–242.

[9] Dio, 55.33.1–2.

[10] App. *Ill.* 14.42, 15.43, 16.46.

[11] Woodman 1977, 46–54; Gowing 2016, 117.

[12] Suet. *Aug.* 10.4; Plut. *Ant.* 22; Pelling 2009, 54.

Octavian's legate Marcus Valerius Messala Corvinus, authored by Albius Tibullus, mentions several notions related to the Iapodes against whom the Romans were at war in 35 BC. As a witness to the courage of Marcus Valerius Messala, Tibullus poetically calls upon the defeated Iapodian warrior (*fortis Iapydiae miles, testis quoque fallax*), then calls upon a poor man born in the Arupini fields (*testis* Arupini*s et pauper natus in aruis*), and finally mentions Domator (*Te duce non alias conuersus terga* Domator / *libera Romanae subiecit colla catenae*).[13] Tibullus mentions that, thanks to Messala's leadership, Domator, who had never retreated before, was defeated, and that the Romans imprisoned/captured? him for the first time.

There are various critiques of this part of the text. Some authors believe that instead of a personal name, Domator should be read as the participle *domante* or as the noun *domator*.[14] If we follow the part of the text in *Panegyricus Messallae* that mentions the Iapodes, it is justifiable to accept it is a personal name in this case. By doing so, Tibullus would actually emphasize the importance of Messala's victory. By mentioning the name of the leader of the defeated people or community, he emphasized the importance of the Roman legate. It should be mentioned that this nomen is recorded on a bronze tablet from Istria (*Piquentum*), which mentions a certain *Ovia Laevica*, daughter of Domator (*Ovia Laevica* Domator*is f(ilia)*).[15] Similar names are also confirmed on inscriptions from Dalmatia, Pannonia, Germania, and northern Italy. The female nomen *Domatia* appears on

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[13] Tib. *Panegyricus Messallae*, 4.1.106–117:
At non per dubias errant mea carmina laudes:
nam bellis experta cano. Testis mihi uictae
fortis Iapydiae miles, testis quoque fallax
Pannonius, gelidas passim disiectus in Alpes,
testis Arupinis *et pauper natus in aruis,*
quem si quis uideat uetus ut non fregerit aetas,
terna minus Pyliae miretur saecula famae:
namque senex longae peragit dum tempora uitae,
centum fecundos Titan renouauerit annos,
ipse tamen uelox celerem super edere corpus
audet equum ualidisque sedet moderator habenis.
Te duce non alias conuersus terga Domator
libera Romanae subiecit colla catenae
(source: *Aliorumque carminum libri tres. Tibullus*. J. P. Postgate in *Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis*, 1915). I would like to thank Dr Dijana Beljan Šehić from the Department of Latin Language and Literature, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Sarajevo, for her assistance in analyzing Tibullus' text.

[14] From the aspect of historical analysis, Boris Olujić specifically addressed this problem in his works (Olujić 1999, 62–63; Olujić 2003, 30–31; Olujić 2007, 89). He mentioned the readings of Levy, Ponchont, Müller, and Havet. Havet and Ponchont introduced the name Domator; Levy introduced the name Domator, and Müller read this place as *Domante*. In the text analyzed in this paper, J. P. Postgate also read this word as a personal name (Postgate 1915).

[15] CIL 05, 449; OPEL II, 104.

an inscription from *Narona* in Dalmatia.[16] On a tombstone from *Savaria* in Pannonia Superior, the masculine form, *Domatius*, appears together with the feminine form.[17] The male nomen *Domatius* also appears on inscriptions from Cremona (*Regio X Venetia et Histria*), Rome (Italy), *Mogontiacum* (*Germania Superior*), and *Scarbantia* (*Pannonia Superior*).[18] A military person with that nomen appears on the monument from *Mogontiacum*, while the *Domatii* mentioned on the inscription from Savaria are freedmen originally from northern Italy.[19] If we follow the distribution of the name *Domatius/Domatia*, which is similar to the name Domator, we get the impression that it is a name that can be associated with northern Italy. Anthropo-onomastic analyses show that some pre-Roman names in the Liburnian-Iapodian area belong to the group of northern Adriatic names, which also includes northeastern Italy.[20] Since the name Domator does not resemble typical Pannonian-Dalmatian names, this is one of the reasons why this important piece of information from Tibullus was ignored in historiography.

Based on Tibullus' text, we can assume that Domator was the military leader of the Arupini.[21] In the context of Octavian's campaign, this Iapodian community is mentioned by Appian, who wrote that they were the most numerous and warlike of all the Iapodians who lived in the Alps.[22] Appian's narrative about the Alps should not be taken literally, because "Alps" in this case means the Dinaric mountains Velika and Mala Kapela.[23]

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[16] CIL 03, 08459 = CIL 03, 01867 = EDH 034222 = EDCS-26600645 = TM 182815 = Lupa 24367.

[17] CIL 03, 04251 = AE 1992, 1393 = EDH 008805 = EDCS-26600171 = TM 195627 = Lupa 45; OPEL II, 104.

[18] AE 1975, 0449 = AE 1987, 0455 = AE 2004, 0616 = EDH 004106 = EDCS-09400436 = TM 123227 = EDH 076310; AE 1989, 0113 = EDH 014415 = EDCS-06100054 = TM 266377 = EDH 081264; CIL 13, 06740a = AE 1901, 0075 = AE 1905, p. 43 s. n. 169 = EDH 032496 = EDCS-16600472 = TM 210659 = Lupa 27154; AE 2006, 1041 = AE 2011, 0970 = EDH 065483 = EDCS-44200230 = TM 406935 = Lupa 29711.

[19] Szabó 2021, 108–109.

[20] Alföldy 1964, 55–104; Katičić 1968, 51; Rendić Miočević 1975, 101; Čače 1985, 68.

[21] Šašel Kos mentions the possibility that Domator was also a Salassian chief or of some other community defeated by Massala Corvinus. However, even Šašel Kos does not reject the possibility that Domator was the leader of the Iapodian Arupini (Šašel Kos 2005, 428). Welch argues that Appian inserts the Salassi, an Alpine tribe, into an account of the *Illyrian War* because, although he was mistaken in thinking they lived anywhere near *Illyricum*, his sources recognized that overcoming such inconvenient obstacles was part of a grand strategy of securing the Alps and Illyricum (Welch 2009, 214, n. 34). Based on the conclusions of the French philologist Ponchont, Olujić also connects Domator with the Arupini. He believes that this is a very important historical fact, regardless of whether Domator is a personal name or whether a Roman poet described an Arupini warrior as a horseman (Olujić 1999, 63; Olujić 2007, 89). There are different opinions as well. Čače rejects the possibility that the conflict between the Arupini and Messala is specifically described here, but rather that this community is mentioned as a well-known fact to the Romans (Čače 1979, 59).

[22] App. *Ill.* 16.47–4.

[23] Čače 1979, 59; Šačić Beća 2023, 97.

Those mountains separated the Iapodian territory into two parts, which was also reflected in the military and political organization. Due to such a landscape, the communities were grouped into two alliances during the conflict with Rome. Based on Appian's information about *the Iapodes in the Alps* and *the Iapodes on the other side of the Alps*, it is assumed that one alliance was made up of the communities that inhabited the southwestern slopes of the Velika and Mala Kapela, and the other consisted of the communities from the north.[24] From Appian's text, we can conclude that the Arupini were the most dominant among *the Iapodes in the Alps*.[25] These alliances were a loose confederation of related communities and were formed probably only in case of danger from an external enemy.[26] The Arupini were the most numerous and warlike community among the so-called Cisalpine Iapodes.[27] Therefore, Arupium had the same role during Octavian's campaign as Metulum for the Transalpine Iapodes or Raetinum for the communities from the Una River valley who fought against Germanicus in Bato's uprising.[28]

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[24] App. *Ill.* 16.47–48, 18.52 Čače 1979, 59; Šašel Kos 2005, 426; Milivojević 2021, 179; Šaćić Beća 2023, 97–98.

[25] App. *Ill.* 16. 48.

[26] Dio suggested that there were three alliances. The third alliance would be represented by the communities that lived in the mountains (Dio, 49.35.1–2). Čače notes that older authors such as Alföldy, Papazoglu, and Suić recognized that the Iapodes were not a single ethnic complex, but ignored Appian's and Dio's information about the existence of multiple Iapodian alliances. Without dismissing the possibility of the existence of a universal Iapodian alliance, Čače believes that two Iapodian alliances existed in the 2nd and 1st centuries BC. Namely, in his *Illyrike*, Appian stated that *the Iapodes on the other side of the Alps* first came under Roman rule in 35 AD, which could not possibly be said for the southern Iapodes (App. *Ill.* 18). The southern Iapodes had been the target of Roman attacks since the time of Cassius Longinus (Čače 1979, 65–71).

[27] A literal translation of Appian's information would be *the Iapodes in the Alps*. Appian defined the position of the Iapodes towards the Velika and Mala Kapela according to the position of observers from the seashore. In contemporary literature, we encounter the term *Cisalpine Iapodes*, which is a modern construct derived from Appian's description (Šešel Kos 2005, 426–430; Džino 2014, 227). However, the term is very practical and has the same meaning as Appian's information on *the Iapodes in the Alps*.

[28] Appian clearly stated that *Metulum* was the capital of the Iapodes and devoted much attention to its siege because Octavian himself was wounded at that time (App. *Ill.* 19–21). However, if we carefully follow the text describing Octavian's campaign, it is clear that Metulum was not the political center of all the Iapodes, but only of the Iapodes on the other side of the Alps. Dio is the only source that described the siege of Raetinium in detail (Dio 56.11–12). It is important to note that Dio did not specify anywhere that *Raetinium* is an Iapodian town, but epigraphic and archaeological findings suggest that *Raetinium* should be located at the site of Golubić near Bihać. This is indicated by the method of burial and the inscriptions on the epigraphic monuments mentioning the Iapodian *principes* and *praepositi* (Bojanovski 1988, 311–315; Raunig 2004, 14; Grbić 2014, 76). The most certain evidence that *Raetinum* was located in the area of Bihać is the inscription of a Roman auxiliary dated to 69–75 AD, stating: *Andes Sex. f. cives(!) Raetinio* (CIL 13, 07023 = EDH 056245 = EDCS-11001084 = TM 212079 = Lupa 15812). It is epigraphically confirmed that in the 1st century *ala Claudia Nova* resided in the Pounje region, meaning that Andes was a recruited soldier from *Raetinum*.

The Arupini were certainly a large community, which is why they had the resources to build the best-fortified settlement in the region and assert themselves as leaders. Members of this community lived in smaller settlements and, in the event of war, they gathered in the largest citadel, which Appian identified as Arupium. This can be clearly concluded based on this quote: *...the* Arupini, *however, who are the most numerous and most bellicose among these Iapodes, moved from villages into their city, and when Caesar drew near, they fled to the forests. Caesar occupied the city, although in the hope that they would surrender, he did not have it burnt; when they surrendered to him, he permitted them to live in it.*[29] We get the impression that the Arupini did not manage to organize themselves well, so Octavian easily defeated them. However, *they fled to the forests* indicates that the Romans actually attacked the smaller settlements rather than the best-fortified settlement, which forced the Arupini to abandon Arupium and defend those settlements. To the Romans, this might have seemed like an escape into the woods, and this could be the reason why Augustus conquered such an important settlement as Arupium without much trouble. The Romans used similar tactics in 155 BC against the Delmatae when they first succeeded in capturing their best-fortified Delminium.[30] Octavian's strategy had to be based on the experience his predecessors had gained from decades of conflicts with the Ardiaei, the Delmatae, and the Iapodes.

There is another analogy between the Arupini and the Delmatae. Strabo and Appian clearly noted that the Delmatae were named after their best-fortified settlement – Delminium. Appian mentioned only the name of the community of Arupini without mentioning the name of their largest town. On the other hand, Strabo only mentioned the settlement of Arupium as one of the largest Iapodian settlements.[31] Unlike Appian, Strabo

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[29] App. *Ill.* 16.48.

[30] *When the Dalmatae withdrew, as winter was drawing near, Figulus hoped that he could attack them unexpectedly, but he discovered that with news of his attack they had again assembled from the towns. He nonetheless succeeded in driving them into the town of* Delminium *from which the people had received the name, first in the form Delmateae, which was later changed to Dalmatae. As he could not take the fortified town by storm, and because of its high position he could not use the siege equipment he had with him, he attacked and conquered the other towns, which had been partially deserted on account of the concentration of forces in* Delminium. *Figulus then had two-cubit long staffs covered with flax and smeared with pitch and sulphur, which were shot by catapults into* Delminium. *They caught fire because of friction and flew through the air like torches, causing fires wherever they fell, until most of the town had burnt. Such was the end of the war fought at that time by Figulus against the Dalmatae* (App. *Ill.* 11.32) (Translated into English by Šašel Kos).

[31] *The Iapodes are settled at the Albion oros, the last mountain in the chain of the Alps and very high. On the one side they gravitate towards the Pannonians and the Ister, on the other towards the Adriatic. Despite having been very warlike they were entirely subjugated by Augustus. Their towns are Metulum,* Arupium, *Monetium, Avendo; their country is poor, their nourishment mainly consists of oats and millet, their arms are Celtic. They are tattooed*

perceived the Iapodes as a coherent community, attributing to them the use of Celtic weapons and body tattooing.[32]

The Romans apparently did not destroy Arupium because the name of the settlement also appears in sources after Octavian's reign, which facilitated the discovery of its location. Thus, based on narrative sources, Roman itineraries, and an epigraphic monument, Arupium is located in Prozor in the Gacka River valley, northwest of Otočac.[33] Given this location, it is completely clear why Tibullus mentioned the fields of Arupium. It is one of the first details that is observed in the landscape of this region.

It is difficult to assess whether there were any battles around Arupium during Octavian's campaign, as there is no direct archaeological evidence.[34] Appian's testimony and the lack of archaeological finds to confirm the conflict suggest that the Arupini probably met Octavian's army somewhere else within their territory. By abandoning their best-fortified settlement, the Arupini made a major strategic mistake. Tibullus' text actually shows that it was Messalla Corvinus, not Octavian, who defeated them. Perhaps this is why this victory is so superficially mentioned in Appian's text, which, nevertheless, focuses on Octavian's military achievements.

In a battle that took place somewhere on their territory, Messalla Corvinus defeated the Arupini, who had abandoned their citadel. These Arupini were led by Domator, whose name can be interpreted as "horsebreaker". Such a name had a very symbolic meaning in the Greco-Roman world, as horsebreakers were respected in their communities. We may recall that Plutarch described the fact that Alexander the Great tamed the horse Bucephalus in his childhood as one of the signs that he would be a great ruler.[35] In Tibullus' text, we can recognize the desire to present Domator as a noble barbarian who has never been defeated before. This made Messala's success greater because, with his help, this brave military leader was conqured for the first time ever. Even if the word Domator is a term for a horsebreaker from Arupium, Tibullus' information certainly refers to a leader and not an ordinary stableman.

It is unlikely that Tibullus fabricated the existence of the leader of the Arupini. Unlike, for example, the Metulians, the Romans must have

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in a similar way as other Illyrians and Thracians (Strab. 7.5.4) (Translated into English by Horace Leonard Jones). In his analysis of Strabo's text, Džino concluded that Strabo 'civilizes' the Iapodes through his projection of their political singularity, calling their settlements 'poleis'. In his view, Strabo's representation of the Iapodes as a single political-ethnic entity is a projection of a cultural or ethnic stereotype resulting from his outsider perspective (Džino 2008, 421).

[32] Džino 2008, 418.

[33] Strab. 4.6.10; Ptol. *Geog.* 2.16.9; *It. Ant.* 274.2; *Anon. Rav.* 4.22; *Tab. Peut.* 4.2; CIL 03, 08783 = CIL 03, 08783 + p. 2136 = CIL 03, 08783 + p. 2326 = EDH 052758 = EDSC 31400666.

[34] Olujić 2007, 90.

[35] Plut. *Alex.* 6.

known the Arupini much better because their territory was much closer to Kvarner, the location of the Roman ports. The Roman offensive against the Arupini probably started at the port of Senia, which was located in the area of present-day Senj, in the north of the Adriatic Sea.[36] There is an assumption that even part of Kvarner was under the control of the Iapodes.[37] After losing territory in the coastal area of the Iapodian community, including the Arupini, they must have had some interaction with the Romans before Octavian's campaign. It would be unusual if the Romans did not know the local leaders. Generally speaking, the Romans did not like defeating nameless enemies; the size and significance of a victory for them was measured by the size and significance of the enemy.[38] Therefore, Messalla Corvinus probably knew the name of the undefeated Arupini commander whom he had put in chains, as Tibullus puts it.

The local aristocracy managed to maintain itself in the Iapodian communities through the function of *principes civitatum* and *praepositum* during the Early Empire.[39] This is indicated by the discovery of votive inscriptions dedicated to the local water deity, Bindus, by the Iapodian aristocrats in the Una River valley.[40] In essence, Roman communication with the indigenous population was based on the interaction they had with the local elites. Regardless of whether this communication was based on economic, cultural, or military grounds, the Romans had to channel their short-term and long-term goals towards the elite. That is why they must have known local community leaders like Domator.

Verso and Testimus – the Delmataean leaders

Only one source, namely Appian, mentioned these two Delmataean leaders. Because of the resistance they showed to Octavian's troops, they occupy an important place in Appian's narrative. The conflict with the Delmatae was not just a conquest task for the Romans. In the winter of 48, the Delmatae humiliated the Romans by inflicting a heavy defeat on legate Aulus Gabinius, who lost five cohorts together with the military stan-

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[36] Cambi 2001, 148; Šašel Kos 2005, 420.

[37] Kozličić 1983, 115–117; Čače 1988, 84.

[38] The importance of this victory over the Iapodes for the Romans is also reflected in the fact that the Iapodes appear on an inscription on the Sebasteion of Aphrodisias in Caria. Three communities from Illyricum are represented on that temple complex: the Iapodes, the Andizetes, and the Pirustae, symbolizing Octavian's successes in three wars: his Illyrian campaign (35–33), *Bellum Pannonicum*, and *Bellum Batonianum* (Grbić 2011, 132–136; Mesihović 2018a, 136–138). The depiction of the Iapodes on the Sebasteion symbolizes the victory during the campaign of 35–33 AD. This proves the strong impression the battles against the Iapodian communities left on Octavian and his legates.

[39] Džino 2009, 356; Kukoč 2009, 235–236.

[40] CIL 03, 14326 = EDH 052238 = EDCS-31300292 = lupa 23298; CIL 03, 14324 = EDH 052240 = EDCS-32300071 = Lupa 23687; CIL 03, 14326 = EDH 052238 = EDCS-31300292 = Lupa 23298; CIL 03, 14324 = EDH 052240 = EDCS-32300071 = Lupa 23687.

dards.[41] This certainly undermined the reputation of the Roman army among the communities in the eastern Adriatic. We should keep in mind that the Delmatae were on Pompey's side in the Civil War, which was certainly another motive for Octavian to finally deal with them.

After the conquest of Segestica, Appian noted that *Caesar consequently set off against the Dalmatae, also one of the Illyrian peoples who have a border with the Taulantii*.[42] The information about the border between the Delmatae and the Taulantii should be understood in the context of Appian's view of Illyricum because the Taulantii and the Delmatae certainly never shared a border. Octavian began his campaign against the Delmatae in the spring of 34 BC. If we compare Dio's and Appian's texts, we can assume that in the first phase of the campaign, the war was led by Agrippa, but later the battles were led by Octavian himself. Appian wrote that the Delmatae laid down their arms for more than ten years, overwhelmed by their success after having soundly defeated Gabinius. Appian further stated that when Octavian set out to attack them, the Delmatae formed several alliances with each other; they had more than 12,000 warriors, choosing Verso as their commander.[43] A significant fact is that the Delmatae entered into alliances with one another. Although the social structure of the indigenous communities in this region before the Roman conquests is not clear, this indicates that the Delmatae, like the Iapodes, were not a single people, but rather a political union that shared certain cultural characteristics.

The organization of the Delmataean alliance

To be able to understand the political and military position that Verso and Testimus had during the period of Octavian's campaign, we need to make a brief retrospective about the origin of the alliance of which

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[41] *BAlex*. 43.1–3 (probably by A. Hirtius); App. *Ill*. 12, 25; *BCiv*. 2.58–9; Dio 42.11; Plut. *Ant*. 7.1; Cic. *Att*. 11.16.1.

[42] App. *Ill*. 24.71. Compared to Appian, Dio noted that Octavian had different plans. According to Dio, Octavian intended to continue the attacks on Britain begun by Gaius Julius Caesar but was prevented by the rebellion of the newly-conquered peoples and the Delmatae. Agrippa unsuccessfully tried to suppress the rebellion, which means that Caesar, or rather Octavian, had to come (Dio, 49.38.2). Džino and Domić Kunić give priority to Dio's narrative compared to the information shared by Appian. According to their interpretation, Octavian was convinced that he personally had to lead the operations in Illyricum after Agrippa's failure. Moreover, Džino and Domić Kunić are critical of Appian's data, because he drew information from Augustus' *Memoirs*, where Augustus often presented himself in a good light at the expense of real historical facts (Džino, Domić Kunić 2013, 156). However, although Augustus is certainly not ready to admit that he was about to make a strategic mistake by underestimating the Delmatae, it is hard to believe that Augustus, or rather Octavian, took the Delmatae so lightly after the intense conflicts with the Iapodes and the Segestanes, especially as the Delmatae were those who gave the Romans the most headaches after the dissolution of the kingdom of Gentius.

[43] App. *Ill*. 34.71–72.

the two were military leaders. The Delmataean alliance, which bordered the Illyrian Kingdom, was probably formed in the 3rd century BC. The communities that lived between the Krka River and the Neretva River allied with the largest and strongest community, which included the well-fortified settlement of Delminium on the Duvanjsko polje.[44] In fact, over 400 fortified settlements have been archaeologically confirmed on the presumed territory of the Delmataean alliance.[45] The complexity of the Delmataean alliance is suggested by several data gathered from sources. Appian mentioned that the Delmatae gathered in Delminium when Gaius Marcius Figulus attacked them in 156 BC, which suggests that it was the most important, but not the only, settlement.[46] He also added that Figulus torched the town, but did not succeed in conquering it. Florus also mentioned the burning of Delminium during Figulus' campaign.[47] This burning may have also had a symbolic meaning, as it was a political center. Strabo and Frontinus noted that consul Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica managed to conquer Delminium, which resulted in a decline of the power of the community that controlled that settlement.[48] It is interesting to note that when describing the campaign of Scipio Nasica, Frontinus pointed out that Delminium was defended by a united population, and that Nasica conquered it only after he began attacking other Delmataean settlements (*oppida*). When the inhabitants of the smaller settlements found themselves in the position of having to defend their homes, Scipio Nasica was able to capture Delminium. Both sources, Strabo and Frontinus, clearly underline that the settlement suffered great destruction. The description of the final destruction of Delminium shows that it had been defended with dignity. Appian's and Strabo's information that the Delmatae were named after that settlement most likely serves as a memorial of these events.[49] Strabo's information that Delminium was a large town (*megale polis*) can also be interpreted along the same lines, although we have no archaeological evidence for this.[50] We can infer from Florus' text that the Delmatae were not strong after Marcius Figulus burned down Delminium, which later made it easier for Asinius Pollio to defeat them.[51]

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[44] Čović 1976, 241; Čače 1994/1995, 120; Škegro 1999/2000, 398–399; Džino 2006, 75; Šačić Beća 2020, 76.

[45] Zaninović 1967, 5–24; Čović 1976, 244; Benac 1985, 193.

[46] App. *Ill.* 11. 30–33.

[47] Flor. 2.25.

[48] Strab. 7.5.5, 315; Front. *Strat.* 3. 6. 2.

[49] Strab. 7.5.5, 315. It is believed that Stephanus of Byzantium also recognized Delminium as the "capital" of the Delmatae based on the texts of Strabo and Appian (Steph. Byz. *Ethn.* 216; Čače 1994–1995, 107, 115). Most scholars concur with the location of pre-Roman Delminium on the hillfort Lib, since it is the only hillfort in Duvanjsko polje (Šačić Beća 2020,70)

[50] App. *Ill.* 11.32; Strab. 7.5.5; Čače 1979, 114.

[51] Flor. 2.25.

Horace mentions that Pollio celebrated a Delmataean triumph.[52] Pollio's offensive is dated to 39 BC.[53] Based on Florus' text, we get the impression that Delminium no longer had the military and political significance for the alliance that it had enjoyed during the time of Figulus and Nasica.

We can assume that Delminium was an important center during the time when the Delmataean alliance was much smaller, during the period when the Delmatae, according to Polybius, plundered the Greek cities of Epetium and Tragurium, as well as the Roman allies, the Daorsi. Polybius also noted that the Delmatae imposed a tax on the peoples they bordered with, which was paid in cattle and grain.[54] The community to which Delminium belonged was probably some sort of local hegemon that took most of the loot for themselves, which is why Strabo ties the destruction of Delminium with greed.[55] If we look at the bigger picture, we can conclude that it was not only the physical destruction of Delminium that weakened the dominant position of its inhabitants in the Delmataean alliance. This was caused by other circumstances as well. As Rome became stronger, the Delmataean alliance was less able to plunder. Moreover, the stronger presence of the enemy influenced other, related communities to join the alliance.[56] One such community[57] could be the one that controlled

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[52] Horat. *Carm.* 2. 1.12–16.

[53] There are different interpretations of this information in historiography. Some scholars, such as Wilkes, believe that Pollio did not wage war with the Delmatae, but that he suppressed the rebellion of the Illyrian people of Parthini in 39 BC (Wilkes 1969, 44–45). However, in his doctoral dissertation, Bilić-Dujmušić claims that the intention was not to refute Pollio's war against the Delmatae at all, but rather to note that Salona was not in the province that had been assigned to Pollio after the Treaty of Brundisium, and that his child was not named after Salona. The author constructed the events based on the analysis of Horace's and Florus' data regarding Pollio's campaign and believes that the war with the Delmatae did take place (Bilić-Dujmušić 2005, 368–369, 375–379). Nevertheless, most scholars believe that Pollio launched a military campaign against the Delmatae and that Florus' information about that conflict should be considered relevant (Čače 1979, 103; Bojanovski 1988,41; Šašel Kos 2005, 373; Džino 2010, 100–101; Džino, Domić Kunić 2013, 141–143; Zaninović 2015, 396–397, Mesihović 2018b, 115).

[54] Polyb. 32.9.

[55] Čače 1979, 114.

[56] Džino believes that the communities inhabiting the central Dalmatian coast were connected to the communities on the inland in terms of culture. The expansion of the Delmataean alliance occurred at the end of the 2nd or beginning of the 1st century AD (Džino 2014, 226). He also notes an interesting fact in the context of the identity of the Delmataean alliance. Namely, in the area where ancient sources locate the indigenous Delmatae, Džino and Barnett – notice an unusual lack of material evidence for wine consumption. They explain that certain communities may have resisted the use of wine. The cultural aversion to wine may have been the result of the long-standing conflicts of the Delmataean alliance with the Romans and their coastal allies (Greek colonies) (Džino 2006, 74–76; Džino 2012, 77; Barnett 2014,14).

[57] Čače poses an interesting question: *did some border communities, although related to the Delmatae, try to preserve their independence by relying on the Liburnians and Romans?* He refers to the fact that Appian always called Promona a Liburnian town, although all other

the well-fortified settlement of Promona. With its expansion, the structure and organization of the alliance certainly had to change as well.

From the sources, we can infer a different organization of alliances in the 1st century BC compared to the earlier period. Namely, in his letter to Cicero, Vatinius reported that he had to interrupt the successfully initiated conquest of the Delmataean settlements (*oppida*) due to snow and cold weather, and mentioned that the Delmatae had 60 settlements. These events are dated to 45–44 BC.[58] On the other hand, Strabo mentioned 50 settlements – *katoikiai*, and singles out Salona, Promona, Ninia, and old and new Sinotium as the most important ones (*poleis*). For Delminium, Strabo clearly emphasized that it had been a major town until Nasica's campaign.[59] We can, thus, clearly conclude that the Delmataean alliance underwent a kind of "decentralization". It is difficult to say how that process took place. The hegemony of the dominant community was replaced by the dominance of the local elites.[60] One community could have built several forts, but such a large number certainly points out to the complexity of the Delmataean alliance. Collective identity among the Delmatae, recognized by the Greco-Roman authors in the 2nd and 1st centuries BC, developed as a result of the warfare with the Greek colonies on the Adriatic, the Daorsi, the Liburnians, and the Romans.[61] The principal body of that identity were the elites. The Delmataean elites probably represented a military aristocracy. As an alliance, the Delmatae had to have a council that made decisions in situations that required unity, such as conquests or defense strategies, as during Octavian's campaign.

Roman-period epigraphic finds indicate the existence of councils among the Delmatae, as well as other indigenous communities in the eastern Adriatic. The inscription mentioning *princeps Delmatarum* originates from Rider (Danilo, near Šibenik in Croatia).[62] Like other similar inscriptions, this inscription is considered to prove that the Delmataean *civitas* was polycentric in Roman times, as it had been in pre-Roman times.[63] This means that the *princeps* from Rider was a representative of the local elite and

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elements suggest that it was a settlement whose inhabitants had more in common with the Delmatae than with the Liburnians (Čače 1989, 87).

[58] Cic. *Fam.* 5.10.13
[59] Strab. 7.5.5. Čače 1994/1995, 155–116.
[60] Čače 1979, 116.
[61] Džino connects the emergence of political alliances between the Delmatae and the Iapodes with the existence of the Roman border zone in the period from the Illyrian Wars to Octavian's campaign (Džino 2014, 222). He believes that after the alliance was established in the 3rd century BC, a new identity was formed. In addition, he notes that we should not search for identity in the elements of a common cultural habitus that the communities in the hinterland of Dalmatia had shared among themselves until that point in time (Džino 2006, 74–75).
[62] CIL 03, 02776 = AE 2014, 01016 = EDH 062402 = EDCS-28300105 = TM 187195.
[63] Rendić-Miočević 1962, 315; Džino 2014, 224; Grbić 2014, 92.

a member of the council of *principes*, and not the leader of all the Delmatae.[64] The Romans probably called this council by its ethnic name, so all the members of the council carried the title *princeps Delmatarum*. We can assume that in pre-Roman times the government of the Delmatae was organized dually. Each settlement (*oppida*) must have had its leader. However, at the level of the alliance, ethnarchs were certainly only representatives of the largest and most important communities.[65] The council at the head of the alliance was in charge of foreign affairs and military policy.[66] At that time, the Delmatae certainly did not have the kind of governing structure that the Romans would connect with monarchy.[67] This is one of the reasons why we know almost nothing about their leaders, as the Romans paid no attention to the organization of alliances.

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[64] The best analogy for this claim is found among the Iapodes. Dedicators with the title *principes Iapodum* appear on several votive monuments discovered in the Una River valley. There are even examples where the *princeps Iapodum* does not have Roman citizenship, clearly indicating that this is a local, pre-Roman elite (CIL 03, 14326 = EDH 052238 = EDCS-31300292 = TM 184263 = lupa 23298). Moreover, the inscriptions from the Una River valley show that these are only leaders of one community from the Iapodian alliance, and not all Iapodes (Šačič Beća 2023, 105–108).

[65] Čače 1979, 116.

[66] The Illyrian envoys who went to Rome certainly included the Delmatae. They wanted to appease Caesar because they had previously fought as Pompey's allies against Caesar's supporters in Illyricum. Although Appian does not specifically single out the Delmatae, but broadly terms the entire delegation Illyrian, some of these envoys must have been the Delmatae, since they are characterized in the sources as Caesar's opponents in Illyricum (App. *Ill.* 12–13).

[67] Using the example of the ruler from the Illyrian Kingdom, we can see that classical authors recognize a dominant political figure in societies that represent a confederation of communities. Thus, for example, Polybius and Appian call Agron a king, although his kingdom was not a centralized monarchy, but probably a union of communities (Polyb. 2.2.1, App. *Ill.* 7.17). On the other hand, during the reign of Gentius, there was an organization that had hints of the Hellenistic type of monarchy (Domić Kunić 1993, 210–220; Cabanes 2002, 168–174, Milivojević 2021, 449–452). Livy mentions that the Histri had a king (*rex* or *regulus*) and local elites (*principes Histrorum*) (Liv. 41.4–11). Čače states that in the political sense, the Histri represented an alliance of communities. Livy called these communities *civitates* or *populi*. The Histrian communities enjoyed a certain autonomy within the alliance. We can assume that the *principes* were the highest authorities in the communities. Based on Livy's testimony, we cannot determine whether the *principes* were heads of communities or members of the local aristocracy. Čače recognized another interesting piece of information about the organization of the Histri in Livy's text. He believes that elites from three settlements – Nesactium, Mutila, Faveria – had a special position in the Histrian alliance, which he calls *tria oppida*. He assumes that the elites from those three settlements were more respected? and perhaps had hegemony over the other Histrian communities (Čače 1979, 93–101). Archaeological research has confirmed the existence of a military elite among the Histri. The military aristocracy was characterized by weapons, as well as other specific objects such as jewelry, ceramic objects, fans, bronze sceptres, etc. One of the most famous sites is the so-called Grave Vault of the Ancestors of Aepulo. This grave reflects the posthumous customs of the Histrian elites and is symbolically named after the most famous Histrian leader (Blečić Kavur 2025, 67–69; 118–131).

The role of Verso in the Delmataean alliance and the battles against Octavian

The Delmataean military leader Verso, mentioned by Appian, probably belonged to the military class, or rather the military elite.[68] Appian called him στρατηγός, a term denoting a military commander. To lead the allied army, Verso did not even have to be a member of the council. However, that council had to appoint him as commander. Namely, Appian noted *they had more than 12,000 men capable of fighting, for whose commander Verso was chosen.*[69] The name Verso may be considered typical of the indigenous communities that inhabited the eastern Adriatic.[70] Up to now now, four epigraphic monuments with this name have been found on the presumed Delmataean territory.[71] It is interesting to note that there is one inscription from Rider, a representative of the local elite, i.e., a member of the council of decurions, which contains the cognomen Verso.[72] Since it is a cognomen, it may be a family name.

Appian's and Dio's descriptions suggest that during Octavian's campaign, the Delmataean alliance was better organized than the Iapodian

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[68] The relatively large number of weapons in the necropolises indicates that a warrior class began to emerge in the Late Iron Age. Some finds, such as Greco-Illyrian helmets, also suggest the existence of a military elite (Čović 1987, 448; Blečić 2007, 92). The existence of a warrior aristocracy in the Hellenistic or Late Iron Age (depending on the point of view) is also confirmed by a recent find at the Vidića guvno site in Vranjevo Selo, near Neum. Research has shown that this is a burial tumulus of a warrior, probably multiple burials. The findings confirm that there was a well-structured warrior aristocracy in this area (Blečić Kavur, Miličević-Capek 2011). In the context of Octavian's wars, an interesting find was discovered in the vicinity of Široki Brijeg. Namely, Škegro believes that a depot of weapons dating back to the 1st century BC was found at the site in Matijevići near Mokro, in the vicinity of Široki Brijeg. This depot may even date back to the period of Octavian's campaign (Škegro 1992, 93). The find was discovered in the plain below the hillfort that served as an observation post for controlling the Delmataean area.

[69] App. *Ill.* 25.72.

[70] Katičić 1963,260; Rendić-Miočević 1971, 172; OPEL IV, 161.

[71] AE 1975, 0680 = EDH 010873 = EDCS-09400592 = TM 181844; ILJug I, 0172 = EDH 033157 = EDCS-10000268 = TM 182306; EDH 034023 = EDCS-57100061 = TM 182617. When it comes to this name, it is interesting to note that it appears on monuments in the area of present-day northern Montenegro, and Transylvania in Romania. These locations are associated in the literature with the migrations of the Delmatae (Mirković 2013, 42–44; I. Nameti, S. Nameti 2010, 114–118). ILJug III, 1814 = CIL 03, 13832 = EDH 003532 = EDCS-29900105 = TM 181753; AE 1910, 0101 = AE 1906, 0032 = ILJug III, 1853 = EDH 029751 = EDCS-10100808 = TM 182185; CIL 03, 01217 = EDH 038984 = EDCS-15900491 = TM 179739 = lupa 11649; AE 2003, 1504 = AE 2010, 1382 = EDH 043799 = EDCS-72800153 = TM 179987; AE 2003, 1485 = EDH 043957 = EDCS-30100864 = TM 180037; CIL 03, 07825 = EDH 046101 = EDCS-28400527 = TM 180767; CIL 03, 01269 = AE 2006, 1108 = EDH 046124 = EDCS-26600988 = TM 180786; CIL 03, 01271 = EDH 046156 = EDCS-26600990 = TM 180787.

[72] *Verzo Balierius / Plati f(ilius) dec(urio) v(ivus) f(ecit) / sibi et Platori / Balierio Pla/ti f(ilio) dec(urioni) fratri* [5]/ *et Sextoni ma/tri suae defun/ctis* (AE 1975, 0680 = EDH 010873 = EDCS-09400592 = TM 181844)

one.[73] Unlike Domator, who can only be associated with one Iapodian community, Verso and Testimus were military leaders who led the army of the entire alliance. Although we do not know how the military commanders were appointed, it is absolutely clear that Verso was not at the head of the entire army. The 12,000 soldiers commanded by Verso, according to Appian, were not the entire Delmataean army, because another part of the army was commanded by Testimus.[74] The situation with the Breucian alliance was similar. In their case, sources clearly identify two military leaders who were appointed to lead the operations against the Romans in the Great Illyrian Revolt.[75] The Delmatae certainly did not engage in conflict with Octavian's troops like some poorly organized barbarian army; they had an elaborate system, with the individual Delmataean military leaders having clearly-defined roles.

Verso was in charge of preventing the Roman troops from penetrating the inland of the Delmataean territory. According to Appian's text, the first step Verso took to prevent the advance of the Roman army was to capture the Liburnian Promona, which was naturally well-fortified.[76] The choice of Promona as a defensive point was not accidental, because Appian mentioned that the Delmatae also captured Promona from the Liburni under Caesar.[77] Although Appian calls Promona a Liburnian town on two occasions, contemporary source criticism indicates that Promona was originally a Delmataean town or fort. This thesis is based on several arguments. Indigenous names from this region, which appear on epigraphic monuments, can be considered part of the so-called Delmataean onomastics.[78] Examples of these names are *Dasas, Carpia, Paio, Panes, Seia, Suttis*, and *Tritanus*.[79] Strabo also includes Promona among the Delmataean

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[73] App. *Ill*.16.48, 18.53, 19–21; Dio, 49.35.1–2.

[74] App. *Ill*. 26–27.

[75] Velleius Paterculus emphasizes that the rebels from Illyricum had several commanders. He also calls Bato and Pinnes *duces*, emphasizing that they had the main authority as commanders (Vell. Pat. 2.110). In this case, the word *dux* would be equivalent to the Greek word στρατηγός which Appian uses for Verso and Testimus. Before the Great Illyrian Revolt (6–9 AD), the Breucian alliance also had a significant conflict with the Romans during the *Bellum Pannonicum* (12–11 BC) (Suet. *Tib*. 9.2; Domić Kunić 2006, 105–109).

[76] App. *Ill*. 25.72.

[77] App. *Ill*. 12.34.

[78] Katičić 1963, 255–292; Čаče 1989, 87; Čаče 2013, 24; Čаče, Milivojević 2017, 431–434; Milivojević 2017, 191–193; Šašel Kos 2018, 44.

[79] CIL 03, 14316, 5 = CIL 03, 14316, 5 + p. 2328, 159 = EDH 058463 = EDCS-32300021 = TM 185683 = lupa 24154; CIL 03, 09839 = EDCS-30301346; ILJug III, 1975 = EDCS-10100914 = TM 182902; CIL 03, 14316, 7 = CIL 03, 14316, 7 + p. 2328, 159 = ILJug III, 1976 = EDH 058452= EDCS-32300023 = TM 185672, OPEL II, 93; OPEL II, 38; OPEL III, 121; OPEL III, 122; OPEL IV, 62; OPEL IV, 102; OPEL IV, 130. Katičić mentions the inscription *Plans Basius Tritarli f.,* which cannot be found in any other literature apart from the *Journal of Dalmatian Archaeology and History* (*Vjesnik za arheologiju i historiju dalmatinsku*) from 1939 (Katičić 1963, 278). Based on sources and archaeological finds, these onomastic ele-

towns.[80] Promona is located in the area of Orišnica (in the vicinity of Drniš).[81] This means that the fortified settlement was located to the left of the Krka River (*Titius*), which is certainly an important piece of information because contemporary research shows that the Krka River was the border between the Liburnian and the Delmataean alliance. As such, Promona was located on the territory of the Delmataean alliance. Moreover, the appearance of this hillfort can be associated with the Delmatae, not the Liburni.[82] Bearing this in mind, it is incorrect to claim that Verso captured the Liburnian town of Promona, when, in fact, Verso only returned part of the seized Delmataean territory. According to the war strategy, this area represented a defensive line for the Delmataean alliance against the Liburni, the Roman allies, and, therefore, the Romans.

This fortified settlement, Promona, was likely seized from the Delmatae by Cosconius in 76 BC. Thus, the Delmatae lost a very important strategic fort from which they could attack the territories of the Roman allies, the Liburni.[83] The Delmatae conquered Promona again, probably around 50 BC, when Caesar was proconsul.[84] The Delmatae rejected Caesar's demands to surrender Promona, and then defeated a strong military detachment that Caesar sent against them.[85] It is worth mentioning that the Delmataean alliance had the help of other Illyrian communities in this conflict. Namely, Appian mentioned that the Delmatae were also helped by some other Illyrians, which shows the complexity of their alliance. During important campaigns, they formed alliances with related, neighboring communities or unions.[86] This could be the reason why we do not find some large communities in the sources before Tiberius' campaigns in Illyricum. Accordingly, we can assume that the Delmataean troops, led by Verso

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ments appear in areas that are associated with the Delmatae. Some of these locations are *Rider, Andetrium,* and Delminium.

[80] Strab. 7.5.5.

[81] Bilić-Dujmušić 2005, 478–488; Bilić-Dujmušić 2006, 49.

[82] Research has shown differences in the shape of the hillforts of the Liburnian and the Delmataean communities. Šašel Kos states that the Liburnian hillforts are more circular in shape; their ramparts are rounded. On the other hand, the Delmatae built hillforts that were more elliptical, with a protruding part off? the rampart wall (Šašel Kos 2005, 246).

[83] Milivojević 2021, 95–96, Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2024, 207.

[84] Čače 1989, 88; Čače 1993, 7–8; Starac 2000, 14; Bilić-Dujmušić 2005, 243–250; Džino 2010, 86; Milivojević 2017, 191ff.

[85] App. *Ill.* 12.34.

[86] Čače, Šašel Kos, Bilić-Dujmušić, and Milivojević believe that these could be the Ditiones who were later mentioned by Pliny the Elder, Strabo, and Ptolemy (Plin. *HN.* 3.141; Strab. 7.5.3; Ptol. *Geog.* 2.16.5; Čače 1993, 7–8; Šašel Kos 2005, 345; Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2024, 208). Both Džino and Domić Kunić agree with this opinion. They state that there is a possibility that the northern borders of their influence extended much further than previously assumed, perhaps even encompassing communities from the deep hinterland that written sources in a somewhat later period refer to collectively as "the Daesitiates" or "the Maezaei". These communities could be equal members of the alliance or political subordinates (Džino, Domić Kunić 2013, 129).

and Testimus, also included warriors from other communities that were under Delmataean military-political influence. Both Delmataean military leaders were certainly great military authorities, which enabled them to command warriors outside the Delmataean alliance.

Although Caesar no longer had the time to deal with the Delmataean-Liburnian conflict due to his conflict with Pompey, the Delmataean troops still lost Promona between 49 and 34 BC. The sources do not reveal which campaign was in question.[87] However, we do know that Verso' first task as military leader was to recapture it. This fort was important to the Delmataean military leader because it allowed for the organization of an army that could change the tactics of warfare in a short period, meaning that the troops would be able to not only defend but also take the offense.

Verso certainly tried to use the strategic advantage of Promona's position, which, according to Appian, was naturally well-secured.[88] To convey the strategic advantage that Promona provided to Verso' army, Appian wrote that it was surrounded by ridges as sharp as a sawtooth. Appian reveals another important piece of information regarding Verso' strategy. Namely, Verso stationed most of his troops in the town, and placed guards on the hills around Promona to watch out for any movement the Romans made.[89] Verso did this so that the Roman army would have to approach Promona using side roads, otherwise, the guards from the hills would notice them. This greatly slowed down the movement of Octavian's troops and made it impossible for them to form a siege line.[90] Verso probably tried to use a strategy that had previously proven successful against the Romans. However, Octavian learned from his predecessors' mistakes. The Delmataean leader wrongly assumed that Octavian would use typical Roman siege tactics, since the Romans had begun building a siege wall. Octavian knew he could not defeat the Delmatae as long as they controlled the hills surrounding the town, so he secretly sent his best-trained soldiers to search for a way to the highest point. A group of soldiers, which Appian described as the most daring ones, probably moved at night, when the Delmatae were not in a position to see what was happening on the ground. During this operation, the Roman soldiers hid in the forest and then, one night, attacked and killed the sleeping guards. According to Appian, Octavian only learned the following day, at dusk, that the soldiers had

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[87] Bilić-Dujmušić believes that the Romans occupied Promona again during the campaign of Aulus Gabinius in 48/47 BC. Namely, Gabinius had to pass by Promona on his way to the Delmataean Sinotium, where he was severely defeated (Bilić-Dujmušić 2006, 41).

[88] Veith, Zaninović, and Bilić-Dujmušić have made a detailed topographical analysis and explained the military actions of Octavian, that is, Verso and Testimus (Veith 1914, 63–80; Zaninović 1974, 304–306; Zaninović 2015, 421–424; Bilić-Dujmušić 2005, 465–510; Bilić-Dujmušić 2006, 465–510, 43–57).

[89] App. *Ill.* 25.72.

[90] Bilić-Dujmušić 2005, 469.

successfully completed the task. Not wanting to give Verso time to get organized, Octavian attacked Promona with the bulk of his army. Simultaneously, he sent smaller detachments to the conquered hill, so that they could descend to the neighboring hills and conquer them. The resulting panic worked in the Romans' favor, as the Delmataean warriors abandoned their positions, fearing that they would be isolated without water, and they took refuge in Promona.[91] Although Verso expertly organized the defense of Promona, he lost because the Delmataean army was not disciplined enough. By abandoning their positions on the hills, the Delmataean army could no longer wage war in the way Verso had planned. However, it seems that Verso also had a backup plan. In case the Romans did manage to expose his strategy, Verso could count on the help of another part of the Delmataean army led by Testimus.

The Romans between Verso and Testimus

While Verso still controlled the positions on the two hills, Octavian ordered the construction of a wall 40 stadia (about 7.5 km) long. Meanwhile, Testimus also brought in another army to help the Delmataean warriors in Promona.[92] We can assume that Testimus' army was smaller compared to Verso'.[93] It is difficult to conclude what the relationship between Verso and Testimus was in the military hierarchy based on Appian's sparse testimony. The arrival of Testimus with an army may indicate that the Delmatae originally planned to keep the Romans busy fighting around Promona while a second Delmataean army launched a surprise attack. However, this plan could not be caried out because Octavian strategically outmaneuvered Verso. Thus, we can say that Testimus' arrival actually became a mission to save Verso' army.

Appian did not call Testimus a commander as was the case when he first mentioned Verso. Appian emphasized that Testimus was a Delmatae, which can be interpreted in two ways. One, he may have done so in order to simplify his narrative or to bring the description of the battle closer to the reader. Two, some army detachments from the Delmataean alliance could have beeen led by military leaders from the communities that had temporarily joined the alliance during the war period.[94] In this case, the emphasis on Testimus' Delmataean origin was not accidental, its purpose being to emphasize his position among the other leaders of the alliance. It is interesting that only one epigraphic confirmation of the name Testimus

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[91] App. *Ill.* 25.73–74.
[92] App. *Ill.* 26.74–75.
[93] Čače 1979, 109–110.
[94] Čače noted that it is quite likely that other leaders were also chosen, given the complexity of the situation and the number of troops that the Delmatae had to arm and deploy in suitable locations (Čače 1979, 109).

has been found in the entire Roman province of Dalmatia.[95] However, this find alone confirms that it is a name of indigenous origin, given to members of communities from the eastern Adriatic .

Appian does not specify whether there were battles between Octavian's and Testimus' troops at Promona. Octavian somehow managed to prevent Testimus from reaching Promona with his army. Testimus probably saw that he could neither win the battle nor help Verso, so he retreated to the mountains. Considering the situation Testimus found on the battlefield, it seems that this was the right decision, because he would probably have been defeated. After Verso lost his position in the mountains, the Romans managed to impose their own way of warfare.[96] This indicates that Testimus was an experienced military leader, familiar with Roman military tactics.

It is possible that Testimus did not completely abandon his plan to help Verso, as Appian says that Testimus witnessed the fall of Promona.[97] Testimus was probably waiting for help from the Delmataean alliance from the inland. The reason could also be that he tried to assess the size of the Roman army and Octavian's tactics and, thus, organize the defense on the inland. According to Appian's text, Testimus did not take part in the final battle, in which the Romans captured Promona.

Unfortunately, Appian's narrative reveals nothing about Verso' role in the battles that ensued around the hillfort itself. Appian mentions that the Romans first managed to defeat the Delmatae, who attacked them from the town, killing a third of the Delmataean warriors.[98] The rest of the Delmataean army took refuge in the citadel. We will never know whether Verso was among those soldiers.

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[95] This is an inscription from Pljevlja, where there was a *Municipium S* (...?), whose population is associated with the migration of the Delmatae. The cognomen *Testo* on this inscription belongs to a female person: (*D(is) M(anibus) s(acrum) / Sex(tus) Statius / Restitutus [5]/ sibi et Aureliae / Testoni coniugi / posuit* (CIL 03, 06354 = CIL 03, 08326 = EDH 026226 = EDCS-30600135 = TM 182111; OPEL IV, 117).

[96] Bilić-Dujmušić concluded that Octavian probably went to meet Testimus. The aim of the Romans was to challenge their opponents to battle on a flat battlefield, where the superiority of the Roman army and tactics could emerge. It is possible that there was a short battle in which the Delmataean alliance failed to withstand the Roman pressure, so they retreated to the hills, which allowed them to defend themselves more easily. However, Bilić-Dujmušić does not rule out the possibility that Appian was right, that is, that a direct battle between Testimus' and Octavian's armies at Promona never took place. We can assume that Octavian attacked Testimus' army and the attack was unsuccessful because Testimus did not want to confront the Romans on the plain. Instead, he withdrew his army to higher ground, trying to lead the Romans into fighting on terrain that did not suit their formations (Bilić-Dujmušić 2005, 502; Bilić-Dujmušić 2006, 55).

[97] *Caesar engaged him, pushed him into the heights and before his very eyes occupied Promona, even before the construction of the wall was completed* (App. *Ill.* 26.75) (Translated into English by Šašel Kos). It could also be interpreted that Appian wanted to emphasize the ease with which Promona was conquered.

[98] App. *Ill.* 26.75.

    The description of the final Roman conquest of Promona in Appian's text is constructed from Augustus' *Memoirs*. It is possible that Verso' army in the citadel was taken over by some other Delmataean military leader who was not as reputable as Verso, which is why Augustus makes no mention of him in his *Memoirs*. Appian stated that the Delmatae were under siege in the citadel for four days.[99] The military leader of the Delmataean troops trapped in the citadel wanted to surprise the enemy. That is why the attack was carried out at night. That night attack surprised the cohort assigned to guard the gate. Compared to a single Roman cohort, the Delmatae from the citadel were certainly more numerous. We can conclude this based on two pieces of information offered by Appian. Verso had 12,000 soldiers, and then two-thirds, or 8,000 soldiers, managed to take refuge in the citadel.[100] Such a large number of people did not have enough food to stay in the citadel for long. The Delmataean military leader was certainly counting on the help of Testimus' troops deployed near Promona. The large number of Delmataean troops and the sudden attack frightened the Roman soldiers, who abandoned their position.[101] The soldiers and centurions from that cohort were later severely punished for that.[102] It was very important for Octavian to defeat the Delmataean army, so he showed no mercy even to the Roman soldiers if they showed weakness.

    The fighting probably lasted all night, since the Delmataean troops only surrendered the next day. Appian did not specify what this surrender looked like. Unlike Bato's uprising, here we have no evidence of any possible Roman negotiations with the leaders.[103] Such negotiations probably

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[99] App. *Ill.* 25.75.

[100] App. *Ill.* 25.72, 25.75.

[101] If Appian's data regarding the number of Delmataean soldiers is reliable, it is unclear why Octavian entrusted only one cohort with the task of guarding the gate of the citadel at Promona. In his reconstruction of the siege of Promona, Bilić-Dujmušić offered several possible answers to this question. The most likely answer is that Octavian made a strategic mistake and underestimated the enemy. A Second possibility is that Octavian placed in that position a cohort he wanted to punish, while the third thesis, which seems to be the most interesting, is that this cohort was actually not the only military unit assigned to guard the citadel. Perhaps the Romans placed more detachments of allies to guard the citadel, but Augustus failed to mention the presence of these in his *Memoirs* (Bilić-Dujmušić 2005, 509; Bilić-Dujmušić 2006, 57).

[102]*He punished the cohort that had abandoned their guard by executing every tenth soldier chosen by drawing lots, and two centurions for each tenth. He ordered that the others should be given barley in place of wheat at meals that summer* (App. *Ill.* 26.76) (Translated into English by Šašel Kos). Suetonius also noted that Augustus enforced strict military discipline (Suet. *Aug.* 24.2). With these methods, Octavian/Augustus attempted to re-establish traditional military practice and the authority of the military leader. His goal was to show that he was not at the mercy of his troops (Campbell 1994, 107).

[103] After the surrender at the *Bathinus* River, Tiberius negotiated with Bato the Breucian and did not punish him but gave him the administration of the Breucian alliance (Vell. Pat. 2.14). In the last year of the Great Illyrian Revolt, Tiberius also conducted complex negotiations with Bato the Daesitiate (Dio 56.16).

did not take place, only a collective surrender. Octavian certainly had a different approach towards the military leaders of the indigenous communities from that of his successor, Tiberius.[104] It seems that Tiberius was more aware of the importance of the local leaders and their role in subsequent processes than his stepfather.

Testimus' tactics and the last attempt of resistance to Octavian's troops

After defeating the forces of the Delmataean alliance and taking Promona, the Romans had a path open to the inland of the Delmataean territory. The leader of the Delmataean alliance, Testimus, was aware that the original plan had failed and that different military tactics should be used after the fall of Promona. Reading Appian's text, we can conclude that Testimus did not leave the mountains around Promona until the Romans had finally defeated all the Delmataean troops defending the hillforts. This indicates that Testimus was waiting for a favorable moment to help another Delmataean commander until the fall of Promona. That moment never came, and Testimus divided his troops into smaller groups and ordered them to move in different directions. We get the impression that Appian considers this a good strategic move. Namely, Appian states that the Romans could not follow them because they did not know the roads. The Delmataean troops used this to their advantage, further confusing them.[105] Testimus used this tactic to have time to regroup his troops in a new location.

We can assume that Testimus was following the movements of the Roman army and assumed that Octavian's next move would be to attack *Sinotium*.[106] This was a well-fortified Delmataean fort located at the beginning of the forest where the Delmataean troops had severely defeated Gabinius in 48/47 BC.[107] Although this was a strategically important, well-fortified fort, Testimus did not have enough time to organize a defense, so he decided to attack the Romans in an ambush.[108] The Delmataean military

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[104] Ovid in *Ex Ponto* complains that Baton was not punished even though he was the leader of an revolt against Rome (Ovid. *Ex Ponto,* 2.1)

[105] App. *Ill.* 27.77.

[106] There is a thesis in historiography that Appian's name of the town is incorrect. It is assumed that this refers to Sinotium mentioned by Strabo when he listed the most important Delmataean towns (Strab. 7.5.5) (Šašel Kos 2005, 447; Zaninović 2015, 424). In his list of towns, Strabo mentions Old Sinotium and New Sinotium. It is believed that Appian's information refers to New Sinotium. The majority of scholars locate New Sinotium at the top of Petrovo Polje, on the hill Balijina glavica (an alternative toponym is Balina glavica), i.e., in the area between the present-day villages of Čavoglave and Postinje Donje (Bekavac, Miletić 2021, 41; Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2022, 84).

[107] App. *Ill.* 27.78; Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2022, 76–77.

[108] Bilić-Dujmušić believes that it was difficult for Testimus to agree to a similar method of warfare after the Roman conquest of Promona. According to Bilić-Dujmušić, Testimus knew

leader wanted to take advantage of the terrain. We can assume that he set up defensive positions in places where the enemy's movements were vulnerable to attack. Testimus knew that the Romans would encounter a great many natural obstacles (gullies, steep slopes, dense vegetation). In such conditions, the Delmatae could fight equally against a stronger enemy. With his strategy, Testimus wanted to restrict Octavian's troops' ability to maneuver.[109] However, Octavian saw through the plan. Like the Spartans at the Battle of Leuctra, the Delmatae were defeated because they used the same tactics, against the same enemy, in multiple wars. The Romans once again proved that they had learned from their previous mistakes.

According to Appian, Octavian first burned down Sinotium, and then divided the army into several smaller parts.[110] He sent soldiers to guard the edges of the gorge while he advanced up the gorge, cutting down the forest, capturing towns (hillforts), and torching everything he conquered along the way.[111] Strabo also mentioned the burning of Delmataean settlements.[112] Using this tactic, Octavian ensured that his troops moved with almost no obstructions. Testimus' mistake was that he set up an ambush for the Romans at the same place where the Delmatae had defeated Gabinius. Octavian and his legates must have been well-acquainted with the location and the way the Delmatae had vanquished Gabinius. It was a disgrace that the Romans did not easily forget or forgive. At some point, Testimus must have become aware that his plan had failed, so he divided the army into smaller groups that were easier to maneuver.[113] In this way, Testimus managed to evade a large-scale military defeat.

In the final phase of his campaign against the Delmatae, Octavian besieged Setovia.[114] We do not know who organized the defense of that hillfort.[115] There is no more information about Testimus in the sources. Did he arrive in the town with his army? He may have organized the defen-

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that if he stationed an army in Sinotium, he would have to defend the town unprepared for a siege. The town was isolated from the Delmataean territory and it would hardly be possible to receive logistical help in time (Bilić-Dujmušić 2005, 513).

[109] More about the military-strategic position of the Delmatae in Bilić-Dujmušić 2013, 462–475.

[110] Since Appian does not mention any fighting, it is possible that Octavian entered the abandoned city and burned it down (Čače 1979, 111).

[111] App. *Ill.* 27.78.

[112] Strab. 7.5.5.

[113] Mesihović, Šačić 2015, 185.

[114] App. *Ill.* 27.79.

[115] Different locations of this Delmataean settlement appear in the literature. Some authors locate Setovia at Šušan brdo near Lučani (Milošević 1998, 331; Šašel Kos 2005, 448, Bilić-Dujmušić 2005, 520), while others believe it is in present-day Senj (Veith 1914, 98–104; 111–112; Periša 2008, 512). Bekavac and Miletić assume that Setovia should be connected to one of the hillforts between Moseć, Svilaja, and Sinjsko polje (Bekavac, Miletić 2021, 42).

se, but apart from a hypothetical assumption, we can hardly say anything else. The description of the military operations around Setovia is tactically very reminiscent of the conflicts around Promona, because while Octavian was laying siege to the city, another Delmataean army came to help.[116] This shows that before the conflict with Octavian, the Delmatae had entrusted the organization of their defense to several experienced leaders.[117] We do not know who the army leader was, but it is obvious that the scenario of the conflict with Verso and Testimus was repeated. Octavian probably used the same tactics as he had against Testimus to prevent the defenders of Setovia from uniting with the allied Delmataean troops that the leadership of the Delmataean alliance? had sent to help. The fact that Appian mentioned the united troops once again confirms the mode of action of the alliance. Octavian must have remembered the battles around Setovia because he had been wounded there. The siege was not short. The question is why, then, do we not know the names of the Delmataean military leaders who led the army so decisively? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that Octavian himself did not win, but rather his legate Statilius Taurus. Namely, Augustus had to return to Rome to assume consular powers in 33 BC, so he handed over command to Statilius Taurus.[118] Unlike the commanders who had previously fought wars against the Delmatae (Figulus, Gabinius, Vatinius), Taurus did not allow the winter cold to make him halt the operations, as desired by the Delmataean leaders.[119] The conquest of Setovia was a turning point not only in Octavian's campaign but in the entire Roman provincial history, allowing the Romans to expand their power in the eastern Adriatic.

After returning from Rome, Octavian continued to wage war against the Delmatae, besieging their settlements and burning down their hillforts, and managed to geographically isolate them, which had two consequences. One was that the other indigenous communities could not help the Delmatae, and the other was that the constant warfare led to food shortages. Appian recognizes these as causes for the surrender of the Delmatae, but in the context of military elites, he notes another piece of information that could be connected to the social organization of the Delmatae. One of Octavian's demands was that the Delmatae deliver him 700 children as hostages.[120] The number of hostages is to be proportional to the popu-

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[116] *When he besieged the town of Setovia, an allied barbarian army came to the aid of the inhabitants, which Caesar intercepted and prevented from entering Setovia* (App. *Ill.* 27.79. Translated into English by Šašel Kos).

[117] Čače 1979, 110.

[118] App. *Ill.* 27.79; Dio, 49.38.

[119] Šašel Kos 2005, 449.

[120] Čače emphasizes that this number is particularly impressive considering that Octavian demanded 50 hostages from the inhabitants of Metulum, and 100 from the Segestanes (App. *Ill.* 21.59; App. *Ill.* 67; Čače 1979, 108).

lation or the number of council members. We can assume that the children of the military elite were given as hostages because they were the strongest advocates of anti-Roman policies. In a symbolic sense, it was particularly important for Augustus that he recover the military standards that the Delmatae had removed from Gabinius.[121] The fact that Octavian depicted the insignia returned from the Delmatae on coins indicates the importance of this.[122] Octavian took every opportunity to use his military campaign in Illyricum for propaganda purposes in his fight against Mark Antony.[123] Classical authors did not record who carried out the negotiations with Octavian. Therefore, the story of the leaders of the indigenous communities in Illyricum during Octavian's campaign of 35–33 BC ends with Testimus.

Conclusion

In their works, classical authors did not pay attention to the military leaders of indigenous communities. After the defeat of Gentius, and until Octavian's campaign, the sources did not record a single name of the military leaders who fought against them, for nearly 130 years. One possible reason is that until 35 BC it was various magistrates that waged wars against the indigenous communities, but after 35 BC the main wars were waged by Octavian and Tiberius personally. Another reason why we have more information about the commanders of the local alliances or communities from the time of Octavian's and Tiberius' campaigns is that we have indirect testimonies from the participants in the events themselves. Appian uses Augustus' *Memoirs* as a source, in which Augustus did not want to leave the opponents he defeated unnamed. Perhaps Augustus' ego is the reason why we know the names of the two Delmataean military leaders.

It seems that not all military leaders whose opponents were those other than Augustus have been forgotten. There is one military leader who we cannot confirm with certainty as a fictional or real hero of his people, and that is Domator, mentioned in the panegyric by Tibullus in honor of Octavian's military leader Marcus Valerius Messala Corvinus. Based on Tibullus' text, we can assume that Domator was the military leader of the Arupini, but not all the Iapodes. In a battle that took place somewhere on the territory of the Arupini, Messalla Corvinus defeated the Arupini, who had abandoned their citadel. That Iapodian community was probably led by Domator, whose name is etymologically interpreted as "horsebreaker". In the ancient world, such a name had a very symbolic meaning and could be associated with a great military leader.

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[121] App. *Ill.* 28.81.
[122] Bilić-Dujmušić, Milivojević 2022, 79–80.
[123] More about Octavian's motives in: Šašel Kos 1999, 257–258

On the other hand, Verso and Testimus are Delmataean comman-
ders mentioned in Appian's *Illyrica*. Fascinated by their military prowess,
Octavian probably personally recorded their names. To be able to under-
stand the political and military position that Verso and Testimus had du-
ring the period of Octavian's campaign, we need to understand the organi-
zation of the Delmataean alliance. Verso and Testimus belonged to the mi-
litary aristocracy. Unlike Domator, who can only be associated with one
Iapodian community, Verso and Testimus were military leaders who led
two armies that represented the entire Delmataean alliance. We do not
know how the Delmataean alliance appointed its military leaders, but it is
clear that Verso was not at the head of the entire army, as it is sometimes
suggested by contemporary literature. This Delmataean commander led
only the troops that were tasked with preventing the Romans from pene-
trating the inland areas of the Delmataean territory. As an experienced
military leader, Verso captured Promona in order to prevent fighting on
Delmataean territory. Although Verso expertly organized the defense of
Promona, he lost because his army lacked the required discipline. By
abandoning their positions on the hills, the Delmataean army could no
longer wage war in the way Verso had planned, which was that he was to
be assisted by Testimus, another Delmataean commander. It is difficult to
guess what their relationship was in the context of the military hierarchy.
Verso probably died during the Roman capture of Promona, because it is
unlikely that Octavian would have remained quiet about his capture.

Another Delmataean commander , Testimus, attempted to defeat
the Romans using the same tactics that had been used against Gabinius'
army. It is possible that he was one of the Delmataean military leaders
who outwitted Gabinius and disgraced the Romans. Testimus tried, unsuc-
cessfully, to use the home advantage, but Octavian was not surprised. Tes-
timus might have organized the defense of Setovia, but we cannot deter-
mine that with certainty. It was Statilius Taurus who conquered this im-
portant Delmataean fort, not Octavian, and this may be the reason why
we do not know the name of the Delmataean military leader who led the
defense. It seems that the defense of Setovia was organized in a similar fa-
shion to the defense of Promona because another Delmataean army came
to help the defenders. The analysis of the events of 34–33 BC shows that
the Delmataean alliance appointed several military leaders during the
war. They divided their troops into several smaller groups, according to
how they waged war, and, thus, no single military leader could rise above
the alliance.

Through the role of their leaders, we can clearly see that the indige-
nous communities were not a single ethnic complex. In the case of
Domator, we recognize the clear existence of a separate identity of an
Iapodian community. On the other hand, the Delmatae built a unique

identity during the war, which was conditioned by external danger, and centuries of experience of warfare with the Romans strengthened this collective identity. The Delmataean military leaders probably also commanded the troops of the communities that were not part of their alliance but had joined them during the war. The army that wounded Octavian must have been much better organized than was believed in the earlier literature.

ABBREVIATIONS

AÉ – *Anneé épigraphique*, Paris.
CIL – *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berlin, Accademia litterarum regia Borussica.
EDCS – *Epigraphik-Datenbank Clauss / Slaby*
    (http://www.manfredclauss.de/)
EDH – *Epigraphische Datenbank Heidelberg*
    (http://edh-www.adw.uni-heidelberg.de/inschrift/suche)
ILIug – Anna et Jaro Šašel, *Inscriptiones latinae quae in Iugoslavia inter annos MCMXL et MCMLX repertae et editae sunt* (Situla, 5, Ljubljana, 1963); *Inscriptiones latinae quae in Iugoslavia inter annos MCMLX et MCMLXX repertae et editae sunt* (Situla, 19, Ljubljana, 1978); *Inscriptiones latinae quae in Iugoslavia inter annos MCMII et MCMXL repertae et editae sunt* (Situla, 25, Ljubljana 1986).
Lupa – *Ubi Erat Lupa* (https://lupa.at/)
OPEL 2 – *Onomasticon provinciarum Europae latinarum, Vol. II: Cabalicius-Ixus*, ex materia ab András Mócsy, Reinhardo Feldmann, Elisabetha Marton et Mária Szilágyi collecta, composuit et correxit Barnabás Lőrincz, Wien, 1999.
OPEL 3 – *Onomasticon provinciarum Europae latinarum, Vol. III: Labareus-Pythea*, ex materia ab András Mócsy, Reinhardo Feldmann, Elisabetha Marton et Mária Szilágyi collecta, composuit et correxit Barnabás Lőrincz, Wien, 2000.
OPEL 4 – *Onomasticon provinciarum Europae latinarum, Vol. IV: Qvadratia-Zvres*, ex materia ab András Mócsy, Reinhardo Feldmann, Elisabetha Marton et Mária Szilágyi collecta, composuit et correxit Barnabás Lőrincz, Wien, 2002.

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