

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN MAGNENTIUS AND CONSTANTIUS II FOR ITALY AND ILLYRICUM

After the dynastic slaughter in Constantinople in the summer of 337, an event that weakened the structure of Constantine's administration, the Empire was again divided on 9 September 337 in the Moesian fortress of Viminacium (*Cons. Const.* s. a. 337; cp. E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire* I [1959] 131 and A. Piganiol, *L'empire chrétien* [1954] 74. The date of the earlier event is not certain). Constantine's three sons agreed that Constantinus II should take the West, Constans Italy, Africa and Illyricum, and Constantius II the East (*Aur. Vict. epit.* 41. 20). The eastern border of the Illyrian military and administrative command was at that time identical with the eastern border of both Dacias, Dardania, Macedonia, and Achaea. The western border followed the line to the western and southern borders of both Norican provinces and ran, by way of the pass Atrans and the station Praetorium Latobicorum, to the eastern borders of the Tarsatica territory in Liburnia. When Constantinus II was killed in the battle near Aquileia in March 340 (*Cons. Const.* s. a. 340; cp. also H. F. Clinton, *Fasti Romani* I [1845] s. a. and O. Seeck, *Regesten der Kaiser und Päpste* [1919] 189), his brother and opponent Constans took over his territories. So Constans reigned — in a very ruthless and tyrannical manner — over all the western Empire, Africa, Italy, and Illyricum up to the borders of Thrace. The East was still retained by Constantius II.

On the 18 January 350 an officers' conspiracy in the Gallic town of Augustodunum removed Constans and established in power the *comes* Flavius Magnus Magnentius¹). His headquarters had probably prepared the ground beforehand in certain neighbouring regions. Accordingly he sought to gain control of the whole of Constans' territory rapidly, before the ultimate struggle with Constantius II, the only surviving legitimate ruler. At this time Constantius II was himself not able to come to the defence of Illyricum, the strategic bridge between East and West, since he was engaged in fighting the Persians on the Euphrates²), even if the victory in that quarter would, in the struggle for primacy, tip the balance in his favour.

Because of the general dissatisfaction with the deposed government, the plot was successful, especially in Gaul, Britain, and Spain. Magnentius marched with his troops to Augusta Trevirorum³, the imperial capital which held the state treasury.

Surprisingly he did not lead the march on Rome himself⁴, but let his officers take over Italy and Sicily for him, which they did very

¹ *Cons. Const.* s. a. 350 and Hieronym. *chron.* s. a. Chronological questions are dealt fully by P. Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* (1964) 8 sq.

² Especially clear in Zonaras XIII 7, cp. E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas-Empire* I (1959) 137.

³ Evidence in Bastien 11 note 36 and p. 48.

⁴ So it had been assumed by all until Bastien.

quickly, in fact by the 27 February 350⁵. The emperor himself led a force to secure his position in northeast Italy and Illyricum⁶. This may appear strange, but no doubt there was a sound strategic reason for his action (v. Fig. 1).

It was in fact due to the uncertainty about the loyalty of the army in Illyricum. For Magnentius this area was vital, and an area he might have to fight for. As the proclaimed successor to Constans




Fig. 1. A. D. 350, early spring. Magnentius (white) occupies Aquileia. The *comes* Acacius (black) loses the *claustra Alpium Iuliarum* military zone (on the eastern border of the Italian prefecture, approximately between Aquileia and Atrians). This was administratively within the Italian prefecture, but militarily (from the death of Constantine II in A. D. 340) subordinate to the army in Illyricum.

— and leaving aside the legality of his usurpation — Magnentius was entitled to control this area, as it had been part of the territory of Constans. His chances of gaining Illyricum do not seem to have been good, even though the soldiers there were showing signs of unrest and dissatisfaction⁷. The Moesian Vetrano, who had been appointed *magister militum* by Constans, remained loyal to the Constantinian dynasty at the time of Magnentius' usurpation⁸.

In these circumstances, therefore, it was necessary for Magnentius to occupy as soon as possible the strategically important and well

⁵ On February 27, 350 (*Chron.* 354 s. a.) Fabius Titianus was imposed by the supporters of Magnentius as *praefectus Urbis* (ILS 741), cp. A. Chastagnol, *Les fastes de la Préfecture de Rome au Bas-Empire* (1962) 109 and 130.

⁶ This is provided by his Aquileian coins, *solidi*, with *restitutor libertatis* and especially the multiple gold coins with the 'adventus' scene and the legend *liberator rei publicae*, issued at the end of February or the beginning of March 350; see Bastien, catalogue No 203, and especially Jeločnik, *Arheološki vestnik* 19 (1968) 206 sq. O. Ulrich-Bansa, *Note sulla zecca di Aquileia romana: I multipli del soldo d'oro* (1936) 51 sq. held also the same view.

⁷ Constans was not popular in Illyricum either, cp. *Jul. or.* I 21 (not completely clear) and Philostorg. III 22.

⁸ *Vict. Caes.* 41, 27.

fortified mountain passes in northeast Italy — usually called the Illyrio-Italian Gates — rather than await an eventual attack from the opposite direction. The entry from Illyricum to Italy was protected by the zone of fortifications known as *Claustra Alpium Iuliarum*⁹. Even though it was technically part of Italy the area was controlled at this period by the army in Illyricum.

Magnentius' action in February, which he completed with great speed, reflects the importance which the new government attached to gaining control of fortifications on the pro-Alpine and Alpine crossings from Illyricum to Italy¹⁰. Control of the defensive line along the northeast border of Italy was at that time much more important to Magnentius than was gaining the favour of the Roman Senate and the leading families at Rome by his presence there.

A similar strategic view — namely, to secure effective control of the entrance zone, but naturally seen from the opposite direction — was taken by the army command in Illyricum, which continued to remain loyal to the Constantinian dynasty. It seems that the action from this side was led by an officer in the region, the *comes* Acacius. However Magnentius' forces succeeded in forestalling him by a small margin, and managed not only to seize control of the whole zone and keep it under western control but even to capture the *comes* himself¹¹ (v. Fig. 1).

As a result of this an invasion by Magnentius from Italy into Illyricum became a real danger to Constantius.

At that time Constantina Augusta, sister of Constantius II and the widow of Hannibalianus, was living in Pannonia with her relative Vulcacius Rufinus, the *praefectus praetorio*,¹² who, along with many senators, had fled from Italy after the usurpation of Magnentius¹³. They realised now that in order to ensure their own survival they ought to enter into some form of negotiations with Magnentius with the object of gaining the time needed before the arrival of Constantius II and his army from the East¹⁴.

⁹ The general study is now: *Claustra Alpium Iuliarum*, I (1971). See also A. Degraffi, *Il confine nord-orientale dell' Italia romana* (1954) 131.

¹⁰ See above note 6.

¹¹ Amm. Marc. XXXI 11,3: *qui* (Sebastianus, *magister peditum* in A. D. 378) *itineribus celeratis, conspectus prope Hadrianopolim, obseratis vi portis, iuxta adire prohibebatur: veritis defensoribus ne captus ab hoste veniret et subornatus, atque contingeret aliquid in civitatis perniciem, quale per Acacium acciderat comitem, quo per fraudem a Magnentiis militibus capto, claustra patefacta sunt Alpium Iuliarum*. Misinterpreted by O. Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt*, IV (1911) 115.

¹² Related to the Constantinian family, he was the brother of Galla, mother of Constantius Gallus, cp. Amm. Marc. XIV 11,27. Correctly: A. Chastagnol, *La Préfecture urbaine à Rome* (1960) 421; wrongly: Palanque in *Historia* 4 (1955) 260 (where there are also other incorrect statements).

¹³ Cp. Jul. or. I 39 and III 36.

¹⁴ The negotiations would have to be on an equal level, otherwise the contacts weren't possible since Magnentius behaved protectively towards him even after Vetrano's proclamation: Zos. II 44 and Philostorg. III 22.

Therefore on the 1 March 350 they invested with the purple the general Vetranio, who is called *salvator rei publicae* on coins issued from Siscia and Sirmium, and at the same time they sent one peace delegation to Magnentius, and another, with an urgent request for help, to Constantius II¹⁵.

Surprisingly Magnentius accepted the delegation and recognized the situation (following the elevation of Vetranio)¹⁶. The reason for this is that he was not yet prepared for a major conflict, while at the same time he seems to have hoped that it offered a means for achieving a political settlement with Constantius II. Then, if in fact he had not already done so earlier, he sent his peace delegation to Constantius II to create the right atmosphere for creating an agreement for co-existence. It seems that Magnentius was prepared to negotiate over the possession of Illyricum from a basis of secure control of Italy, the reason being partly that it was becoming obvious that events in the Illyrian sector were not likely to go smoothly for Magnentius.

Magnentius' operations in Illyricum planned for the early summer of 350 were prevented by the unexpected usurpation in Rome of Flavius Popilius Nepotianus on the 3 June 350, an act that was, as part of the same policy behind the usurpation of Vetranio in Illyricum, instigated by the Constantinian family¹⁷. Although it was suppressed within one month by the *comes* Marcellinus, its initial success indicates that rather unstable situation which existed in Italy¹⁸.

At the same time the pressure exerted by the German peoples, which had been provoked in the same manner from the East¹⁹, became stronger. All these events necessitated speedy and firm decisions at Magnentius' headquarters in the hinterland of Italy. In July or August, therefore, he nominated his relative Decentius as Caesar in the West²⁰.

Only then were he and his army free to mount operations in Illyricum, although he did not actually begin them immediately. Instead he continued with his preparations and also with the negotiations which were still continuing. This interlude of negotiations and political manoeuvring lasted until 25 December 350, when the army of the East marched into Serdica and on the same day Vetranio resigned the purple when he met Constantius II at the Dardanian capital Naissus, which lay within his own military and administrative area.

¹⁵ *Cons. Const.* s. a. — Cp. *Jul. or.* I 21.

¹⁶ Cp. above note 14 and the table of peace delegations on p. 209...

¹⁷ *Cons. Const.* s. a. — So it is assumed also by A. Chastagnol (see Bastien p. 14 note 61).

¹⁸ Cp. A. Chastagnol, *La Préfecture urbaine à Rome* (1960) 209.

¹⁹ Established by Liban. *or.* XVIII 33 and 52. Sozom. V 1, 2, 2,22 and 20. Cp. Socrat. III 1,26 and 33 and 38. Zosim. II 53,3. Bastien p. 18 dates this action to the year 351.

²⁰ Bastien p. 15 proved it in details.

In other words Vetranio submitted to Constantius II at the very first opportunity available to him, an event which probably came as a great surprise to Magnentius²¹.

THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ANTAGONISTS IN A.D. 350

No	Approx. Date	Sender	From	Addressee	Destination	Subject	References
1	Febr.	Magnentius	Gallia	Constantius	Orient	Request for recognition	Inferred, cp. <i>Jul. or.</i> I 21
2	Febr.	Magnentius	Gallia	Vetranio	Sirmium	Demand for loyalty	Inferred
3	Febr.	Vetranio	Sirmium	Magnentius	Italia	Refusal of loyalty	Inferred
4	1 March	Vetranio and Constantina	Sirmium	Constantius	Orient	Resumé, request for strong support	<i>Joh. mon. passio S. Artemii</i> <i>Jul. or.</i> I 21. <i>Zon.</i> XIII 7 17. <i>Cp. Philostorg.</i> III 22
5	1 March	Vetranio	Sirmium	Magnentius	Italia	Proposal of pact	<i>Zon.</i> XIII 7, 16
6	2 March	Magnentius	Aquileia	Vetranio	Sirmium	Sends diadem and help and orders Illyrian army to give support	<i>Zos.</i> II 44. <i>Philostorg.</i> III 22
7	April	Constantius	Orient	Vetranio	Sirmium	Agrees to request (4), sends diadem and money, and orders his units in Scythia to assist	<i>Jul. or.</i> I 24. <i>Philostorg.</i> III 22. <i>Artemii passio</i> 11. <i>Cp. Zon.</i> XIII
8	April	Constantius	Orient	Nepotianus	Rome	Encourages usurpation	Inferred
9	April	Constantius	Orient	German tribes	Rhenish	Requests attacks on frontiers	<i>Sozom.</i> V 1. <i>Zos.</i> II 53 (dates in A. D. 351)
10	May	Vetranio	Sirmium	Magnentius	Aquileia	Makes pact	<i>Jul. or.</i> I 24 and III 22
11	May	Magnentius	Italy	Constantius	Orient	Episcopal delegation, request for recognition	<i>Athanas. apol. ad Const.</i> 9
12	Sept.	Magnentius	Italy	Constantius	Hieraclea Thraciae	Request for peace and proposal of marriage alliance	<i>Zon.</i> XIII 7, 18. <i>Petr. Patr.</i> rg. 14 (edd. Bekker, Niebuhr, p. 129 sq.)
13	Sept.	Vetranio	Sirmium	Constantius	Hieraclea Thraciae	As No 12, but only formality	<i>Zon.</i> XIII 7, 18. <i>Petr. Patr.</i> frg. 14. <i>Cp. Bastien</i> 16
14	Oct.	Constantius	Thracia	Vetranio	Moesia	A formality	<i>Jul. or.</i> I 24. <i>Philostorg.</i> III 24. <i>Zos.</i> II 44
15	Oct.	Constantius	Thracia	Magnentius	?	Reproaches him and orders him to abdicate	<i>Jul. or.</i> I 24. <i>Zos.</i> II 44
16	Dec.	Vetranio	Moesia	Constantius	Serdica	Vetranio advances to meet him	<i>Zon.</i> XIII 7, 23. <i>Philostorg.</i> III 22
17	25 Dec.	Vetranio	Naissus	Constantius	Naissus	Abdicates	<i>Zos.</i> II 44. <i>Zon.</i> XIII 7, 24. <i>Philostorg.</i> II 22

Although the usurpation is adequately documented by ancient and described by modern historians the interpretation has always varied; and as nobody until now has assembled the evidence to give a full picture of the usurpation, I propose to set out here the relevant material.

Illyricum, which would have belonged automatically to Magnentius, was by means of the loyal Vetranio's usurpation in fact regained for Constantius II. But, regardless of this, the feigned nature of the usurpation is demonstrated by the presence in Illyricum of the ambitious Constantina, the emperor's sister, and their relative Vulcacius Rufinus, the *praefectus praetorio*, and by the immediate report to Constantius II about the simulated usurpation together with the petition for help against Magnentius, which was immediately granted by the emperor — at least as much as he could at that moment. He placed his armies in Scythia and Thracia under the orders of the 'usurper', while he did not even grant an audience to the delegations from Magnentius. Furthermore he sent to Vetranio both money and a diadem, which is never represented on his coins, which bear only the laurel wreath; moreover Magnentius is never mentioned, only Constantius II. Less direct proof of the collaboration is furnished by the usurpation in Rome, the second organized by a Constantinian group; and by the instigation of the Ger-

²¹ On the date see O. Seeck, IV 429 (above note 11), which corrects also the mistake of localization in *Chron.* 354. Naissus: Hieronym. *chron.* s. a. 351.

man peoples to attack the power of Magnentius. It is revealed more than anything else, however, by Vetrano's immediate abdication at Naissus on the frontier of his military and administrative area, the instant that Constantius II arrived there, together with the benevolent and patronizing attitude of the latter towards the usurper, whom he addressed publicly as his father (Zonar. XIII 7 p. 16a. cp. Philostorg. III 22).

Immediate military attack by either side had to be postponed until the spring of 351. For reasons of security the emperor's nephew Flavius Constantius (Gallus), who had shortly before married the emperor's sister Constantina, was nominated as Caesar in the East on 15 March 351²².

Because Magnentius had not made up his mind about the decisive blow — due to uncertainty about the force of the enemy, as well as a loss of nerve before committing himself to the decisive struggle — in early summer 351 Constantius II tried to break through from Sirmium²³ and Poetovio to Italy and Emona (v. Fig. 2). The attempt




Fig. 2. A. D. 351, early summer. Indicated are the borders of the Illyrian prefecture (Vetranio's kingdom). Constantius II (black arrow) tries to break through the western border of the Illyrian prefecture (at Atrians, today Trojane in Slovenia) and to occupy the *claustra Alpium Iuliarum* military zone but without success.

was resisted strongly on the Italian border at the eastern edge of the fortified *Claustra Alpium Iuliarum* zone in the narrow valleys around the pass at Atrians²⁴; and the initiative automatically passed over to

²² *Cons. Const.* s. a. 351. — To the marriage of Constantius Gallus see O. Seeck (above note 11), IV 108 and PLRE s. v. Gallus 4.

²³ *Socrat.* II 28, 23.

²⁴ *Jul. or.* I 28, 38. III 7, 14 and 36, 18. *Zos.* II 45, 3.

Magnentius' Gallic, Frankish, Saxon, and Iberian units²⁵. Julian claims that Constantius II retreated for 'tactical reasons'²⁶. Nevertheless the withdrawal opened up to Magnentius a great area of southern Pannonia. On this occasion Magnentius decided to pursue him immediately and obtain through force of arms what he could not get through negotiation.

Two recent studies have enlarged our understanding of the relations between Magnentius and Constantius II — especially in matters of chronology. These are: P. Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnence* (1964) and Jeločnik, 'Les multiples d'or de Magnence découverts à Emona', *Revue numismatique* 35—37 (1967) 209—235 (cp. *Arheološki vestnik* 19 [1968] 201). The first provides also a biography of Magnentius and a general history of the period which supersedes virtually all that has been written previously. The major syntheses, such as O. Seeck's *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt* VI 92, which is written in a lively way and based on the sources, is rather limited in scope and far from exhaustive; and also the somewhat romantic narrative of V. Duruy, *Histoire des Romains* VII (1885). They remain important only for supplying the outline of the historical background, while Ensslin's articles (RE XIV [1928] 445—452 and VIII A [1958] 1838—41; cp. also J. Moreau, *JBfAChr* 2 [1959] 165 and 179) still contain information to supplement the work of Bastien.

N. H. Baynes (in *Byzantion* 2 [1925] 149) pointed out the difficulty in understanding the outline of the year 351, because of Zosimus II 43 sq. The lawyer was obviously misled by some panegyric (cp. Seeck, *Hermes* XLI 483. Olivetti, *Rivista di filologia* XLIII 321) and, knowing neither the area nor the intentions of the commanders, confused completely his account of events. The same criticism applies to Zonaras (cap. XIII), who had available to him a much more detailed source (cp. the resignation of Vetranio, XIII 7,27). Baynes is unable to find a solution. It is impossible to make any corrections to Zosimus' text, but I see no reason for despair, since we can make some reconstruction of events from the historical point of view. Although a panegyric the words of the contemporary Julian are precise enough to enable us to recover the order of events and make the intentions of the antagonists quite clear. Moreover Baynes, as well as other historians, including Bastien, overlooked the important notice in Ammianus Marcellinus (XV 11) relating to the events of 350 (which Seeck and Ensslin mistook as referring to the year 352), concerning the critical importance of the borders limiting the administrative areas and the concern for them. Also they did not consider the role of the Illyrio-Italian Gates, nor did they consider as significant the actions of Vetranio, Magnentius' rapid strike against Aquileia, or the importance of Illyricum. They are also not sufficiently familiar with the character of the terrain which was responsible for the rapid movement of army units, and the changing of plans by the army commands. One must always bear in mind that only three major routes lead from Italy to Illyricum: (1) through Tarsatica to Dalmatia (an advance across the coastal mountain chains to the interior of Illyricum would be strategically a nonsense), (2) via Emona to Siscia (that is along the river Save), (3) via Emona to Poetovio (along the river Drave). At that time the border ran from the Karavanken mountains through the pass at Atrans and beyond Praetorium Latobicorum to Tarsatica.

The pass at Atrans opens the route to southern Pannonia through Poetovio along the river Drave, not the Save (v. Fig. 3). While this

²⁵ Jul. or. I 28.

²⁶ Jul. or. I 29. III 7.

route was now open to Magnentius' units²⁷, the parallel invasion route along the river Save in Lower Carniola, from the Italian border (near the station Praetorium Latobiorum) to Siscia, remained more or less in the hands of the Illyricum army; it was this which maintained the threat of Constantius' forces breaking into northern Italy, in the event of Magnentius' main forces becoming engaged in the Drave valley.




Fig. 3. A. D. 351, summer. White arrow: Magnentius; stippled area: the *claustra Alpium Iuliarum* military zone. Magnentius' army counter-offensive: Atrans-Poetovio-Aqua Viva (today Petrijanec in Western Croatia). Here: the changing of the high command plan. Occupation of the stronghold Siscia (in August). Failure at Sirmium and Cibale. Decisive battle at Mursa on September 28, 351. Constantius gains control in Illyricum.

In the phase following Constantius' initial failure, when the initiative had passed over to Magnentius, two tactical plans were under consideration at the latter's headquarters. The first, and probably the earlier plan, involved an invasion by the southern route through Illyricum to the East involving Magnentius in an exhausting struggle for positions, since one group among his commanders always held the advance through Illyricum as quite feasible²⁸. The second was adapted to later situation, and involved a frontal assault on the main force of Constantius: it was this plan which prevailed. At first, however, some sort of compromise between the two seems to have been necessary. Siscia had to be occupied and control established over the southern invasion route through Lower Carniola before Magnentius could risk marching his forces towards Sirmium to engage the main army of his enemy.

At Poetovio the eastern magistrale is crossed at right-angles by the Augustan road which linked the main military centres of Illyri-

²⁷ Zos. II 46, 1.

²⁸ Zos. II 46: ἐπὶ Ἰλλυριοῦς.

²⁹ *It. Ant.* 266, 2 (Dautonia). *Ptol.* II 14, 4.

cum (Carnuntum, Scarbantia, Poetovio, Siscia, and Burnum), and which crossed the river Save at a fairly suitable spot at Andautonia, the bridge-head and the last station on the road before Siscia²⁹. The Save, which winds its way out of mountainous narrows at Neviodunum, becomes more and more difficult to cross the farther it flows eastwards. This is the point where Magnentius tried, and indeed had to try, for a breakthrough. With great effort, and in spite of initial failure, he succeeded in securing control of it about the middle of the summer of 351. This emerges from obscure passages in Zosimus³⁰, and it is also indicated by a short-lived output of *maiorinae* for Magnentius and Decentius at the Siscia mint, in August and September of that year³¹.

Because the ensuing rapid march along the Save to Sirmium³² did not succeed, it became more desirable, considering the unfriendly attitude of the wealthy political aristocracy in Italy, to push back the army of the East to Thrace, and to force it back from one position after another, since there was always the possibility that Constantius' army command would use this situation to move into Italy and isolate Magnentius in Illyricum. Thus the latter turned away and attacked Mursa, threatening it so seriously that Constantius II was forced to join battle at once.

Constantius' bloody victory at Mursa on the 28 September³³, where the army commanders were unable to halt the slaughter, inflicted severe losses on both sides and so disrupted Magnentius' central command that, after abandoning all hope in Illyricum, he destroyed communications and store depots³⁴ as he withdrew, and increased fortifications on the frontier zone between Emona and Aquileia while he sought safety in Italy. Magnentius did not abandon the Italian frontier fortress of Emona, although the approaching winter prevented Constantius from attempting to occupy it³⁵. Magnentius, keeping in mind the forthcoming attack on the *Claustra*, remained at Aquileia restoring the shattered and unstable condition of Italy and neighbour-

²⁹ They are especially indicated by Baynes, *Byzantion* 2 (1925) 149. Also there is the mainly accurate account of the fight for Siscia by O. Seeck, IV 110.

³⁰ Bastien p. 18. — On the numismatical problems cp. also: K. Kraft, *Die Taten der Kaiser Constans und Constantius II*, in *Jahrbuch für Numismatik und Geldgeschichte* 9 (1958) 141—186. L. Laffranchi, *Commento numismatico alla storia dell' imperatore Magnezio e del suo tempo*, in *Atti e memorie dell' Istituto Italiano di numismatica* 6 (1930) 134—205. P. V. Hill, J. P. Kent, R. A. Carson: *Late Roman Bronze Coinage*, A. D. 324—498 (1960). M. Vasić, *Nov milijarenzis imperatora Vetraniona*, in *Starinar* 19 (1969) 235.

³¹ Zos. II 49.

³² The date: *Cons. Const.* s.a. 351. On the battlefield: J. Brunšmid, *Colonia Aelia Mursa*, *Vjesnik Hrvatskoga arheološkoga društva*, NS 4 (1899—1900) 21—42. Fluss, RE XVI (1934) 670—677.

³³ Jeločnik (above note 6), p. 216 pointed out the significance of the milestone CIL III 3705.

³⁴ More evidence about this is cited by Jeločnik, p. 216.

ing territories, mainly by increasing the financial pressure for taxes and requisitions upon the population³⁶, as well as attempting to restore the military defences.

τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀλπεων τεῖχος παλαιὸν τε ἦν φρούριον, καὶ αὐτῷ χρῆται μετὰ τὴν φυγὴν ὁ τύραννος, ὥσπερ ἔρυμά τι νεο-
ουργές ἀποφήνας καὶ ἀξιόλογον φρουρὰν ἀπολιπὼν ἐρρωμένων
ἀνδρῶν (Julian, *Or.* III 17₂₀₋₂₃ Bidez).

In a similar manner Constantius II was repairing the damage, re-establishing peace, re-organizing the army units, and proclaiming a general amnesty³⁷. In addition he had Africa blockaded by the navy and marines, and policed the river Po and the routes from Gaul to Spain. Constantius also prepared his strategy for occupying the *Clau-*




Fig. 4. A. D. 352, July/August. Constantius II occupies the *claustra Alpium Iuliarum* military zone with combined moves. Decisive battle: Ad Pirum (today Hrušica in Slovenia), followed immediately by the seizure of the headquarters city Aquileia.

³⁶ Jul. *or.* I 27.

³⁷ CTh IX 38.

stra zone and the Illyrio-Italian Gates. This was all planned from Sirmium, where he was still in residence on the 27 May 352³⁸.

With a powerful and rapid stroke Constantius finally broke through the Alpine *Claustra*³⁹ (v. Fig. 4). He had the key fortress Ad Pirum surrounded by using the side routes, and cut it off from the hinterland and from the main headquarters from Aquileia, with the result that it soon capitulated.

The capture of the fortress is described by Julian in two panegyrics. In the panegyric *Εἰς Κωνσταντίον*, which was written in A. D. 356, that is four years after the battle, and in the *Κωνσταντίος ἡ περὶ βασιλείας* from A. D. 358. The future emperor Julian says (III 18₁₋₁₄ Bidez):

Καὶ ἵνα μὴ διατρίβειν δοκῶ αὐθὺς τε ὑπὲρ τῶν δυσχωριῶν διαλεγόμενος καὶ ὥς οὔτε στρατόπεδον ἦν οὐδὲ χάρακα πλησίον καταβαλέσθαι οὔτε ἐπάγειν μηχανὰς καὶ ἐλεπόλεις, ἀνύδρου δεινῶς ὄντος καὶ οὐδὲ μικρὰς λιβάδας ἔχοντος τοῦ πέριξ χωρίου, ἐπ' αὐτὴν εἴμι τὴν αἵρεσιν. Καὶ εἰ βούλεσθε τὸ κεφάλαιον ἀθρόως ἐλεῖν τοῦ λόγου ὑπομνήσθητε τῆς τοῦ Μακεδόνος ἐπὶ τοῦς Ἰνδοὺς πορείας, οἱ τὴν πέτραν ἐκείνην κατέγκουν, ἐφ' ἣν οὐδὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἦν τοῖς κουφοτάτο ἰσάναπτῆναι, ὅπως ἑάλω, καὶ οὐδὲν πλέον ἀκούειν ἐπιθυμήσετε, πλὴν τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὅτι Ἀλέξανδρος μὲν ἀπέβαλε πολλοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐξελὼν τὴν πέτραν, ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος ἄρχων καὶ στρατηγὸς οὐδὲ χιλιάρχον ἀποβαλὼν ἢ λοχαγόν τινα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὀπλίτην τῶν ἐκ καταλόγου, καθαρὰν καὶ ἀδαικρυν περιεποιήσατο τὴν νίκην.

And addressing the emperor himself (*Or.* I 32₁₋₉ Bidez):

Ἐστράτευες μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπαίθριος, καὶ ταῦτα πλησίον παρούσης πόλεως οὐ φαύλης· τοῖς στρατευομένοις δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιτάγματος τὸ πονεῖν καὶ κινδυνεύειν, ἐξ ὧν δὲ αὐτὸς ἔδρας παρεγγυῶν, ἀτραπὸν μὲν ἐξεῦρες ἄγνωστον τοῖς πᾶσι, πέμψας δὲ ἀξιόμαχον τῆς δυνάμεως ἀπάσης ὀπλιτῶν μοῖραν, εἴτα ἐπειδὴ σαφῶς ἔγνωσ αὐτοὺς τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐφρεστώτας, αὐτὸς ἀναλαβὼν ἥγες τὸ στράτευμα, καὶ κύκλῳ περισγὼν πάντων ἐκράτησας. Ταῦτα ἐδράτο πρὸ τῆς ἔω, ἡγγελο δὲ πρὸ μεσημβρίας τῷ τυράννῳ.

After this the gates to Italy were opened to him, as they were to be forty-two years later for Theodosius I at the famous battle in the valley of the river Frigidus, from which it obtained its name — the battle between declining paganism and the conquering Christianity. This occupation of the *Claustra* was probably carried out in August⁴⁰, because already on the 26 September Constantius II designated his relative Naeratius Cerealis as *praefectus Urbis*⁴¹.

³⁸ CTh VII 1,2 and 7,3. O. Seeck, *Regesten der Kaiser und Päpste für die Jahre 311 bis 476 n. Chr.* (1919) 199 sq. Precisely to this period dates also the rarely noticed tombstone with Greek inscription from Sirmium: ὑπατεῖα τῶν δεσπότην· ἡμῶν Φλαυ(ίου) Ἰουλ(ίου) Κωνσταντίου ἀνικῆτου σεβαστοῦ τὸ ε̅ καὶ Φλαυ(ίου) Κωνσταντίου ἐπιφανεστάτου | κέσαρος μηνὸς Ξανδικοῦ (!) δκ ἐθόθῃ εἰς τὴν μνημίαν ταύτην Βασιλιανὸς Πρα[...]| τεύτης υἱός [...]. — with *monogramma Christi* and Alpha and Omega between lines 6/7. Date: 24 April 352. Photo: R. Noll, *Vom Altertum zum Mittelalter* (1958) 25 No 5 Fig. 19 (with bibliography).

³⁹ Judging from the Magnentius' carelessness there is a possibility that the garrisons of many fortresses passed over to him in the same way that part of Magnentius' troops, led by Silvanus, had earlier passed over to Constantius II at Mursa (Amm. Marc. XV 5,2. *Jul. or.* I 39. Zonaras XIII 8,9).

Magnentius moved to Gaul with his supporters, fighting during the retreat from Italy, especially at Pavia, and at the river-crossings. The struggle for Italy and Illyricum was over. The *praefectus Urbis* dedicated a statue to the *restitutor urbis Romae adque orb[is] et extinc-tor pestiferae tyrannidis*⁴². Constantius II annulled the orders and decrees of Magnentius with the proclamation *ad universos provinciales et populum* on the 3 November 352⁴³.

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⁴⁰ Jeločnik p. 216.

⁴¹ *Chron.* 354 s. a. 352. Cerealis was the brother of Vulcacius Rufinus and Galla, mother of Constantius Gallus, v. Amm. Marc. XIV 11,27.

⁴² CIL VI 1158=ILS 731.

⁴³ CTh XV 14,5. — This is the second part of a paper (enlarged), read at The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton (N. J.) on February 25, 1970. I am grateful to John J. Wilkes for help with English.